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ESSAYS IN REALISM: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Nigel Mackay and Agnes Petocz 
 
Part 1 of the book, THE NATURE AND CONTEXT OF REALISM, con-
sists of three chapters. In Chapter 1 (the previous chapter), Realism 
and the State of Theory in Psychology, we discuss the problems and 
challenges of the state of theory in psychology, and then set out the 
elements of the realist approach that informs the essays in this col-
lection, briefly considering the development of realism, and its gen-
eral import for psychology. In Chapter 2 (the current chapter), Es-
says in Realism: Analysis and Discussion, we provide an introduction to 
each of the essays, commenting on their relevance and their role 
within the collection. In Chapter 3, Anderson’s Development of (Situ-
ational) Realism and its Bearing on Psychology Today, Fiona Hibberd pre-
sents a more detailed discussion of the history and development of 
this realism.  
 Hibberd’s essay starts briefly with the background to and influ-
ences on Anderson’s work, his bringing together of various realist 
strands in earlier thought into a systematic and thoroughgoing real-
ist philosophy, and some important contrasts with his contemporar-
ies. She continues and elaborates the same realist themes that we 
have introduced in Chapter 1, though in a different way and in 
places in more detail: the primacy of ontology; the idea of the situa-
tion or propositional nature of reality; the logic of relations; deter-
minism and the idea of a causal field. In addition, she blends into 
this discussion other related matters that we have mentioned only 
briefly or not at all: Anderson on the categories, or categorial fea-
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tures of situations; the general nature of science and critical en-
quiry; Anderson’s mode of argument; and some similarities to and 
differences from other major thinkers, e.g., Hume, Kant, Alexander, 
Wittgenstein, Russell, Dewey and pragmatism. 
 Hibberd’s chapter is introductory in the sense that it covers the 
basics of situational realism, their philosophical provenance and 
development in Anderson’s work, and it sets out the ideas that are 
preparatory to the psychological essays that make up most of the 
rest of this collection. Yet it is not introductory in the sense of being 
a “realism for beginners”. It deals with a number of difficult phi-
losophical notions, and it may be sufficiently detailed and novel to 
make even informed psychological readers feel dropped in the deep 
end of something that is not their specialisation. We suggest, how-
ever, that it is valuable to read early, if not to grasp all the detail, at 
least to glean a general picture of the bases and context of realism 
and to get a sense of the intellectual provenance of the later essays. 
Then, perhaps after reading the other essays, a return to Hibberd 
will add further substance and context to the other authors’ at-
tempts to come to grips with the various conceptual problems of 
psychology. 
 Part 2: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PSYCHOLOGY (Chapters 4-7) illus-
trates a historical transition phase. It is concerned with the way the 
principles of philosophical realism, as articulated in Anderson’s work, 
have developed into a psychological realism as articulated in the 
works of Maze and others, a realism that makes explicit its impor-
tance to psychology.  
 There are many places where Anderson discusses the realist prin-
ciples that have been introduced and set out in Part 1 of this book. 
But his 1927 essay The Knower and the Known (Chapter 4) both repre-
sents a distillation of realism and, if it is not easily accessible to psy-
chologists, it is directly relevant to their interests: It deals with cog-
nition, a theme at the heart of modern psychology, and with the 
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underlying doctrines that lead to misunderstandings about the na-
ture of cognition. 
 In effect Anderson sets out the “cognitive situation” that we in-
troduced in Chapter 1—albeit in epistemological, philosophical 
terms, rather than psychological, making clear the ontological 
grounds on which the knower (the cognising subject) has to be dis-
tinguished from the known (the object of knowledge), and the rela-
tion between them. Although written primarily for philosophers, 
Anderson’s paper is characteristically clear and direct in style, albeit 
compact with meaning. It shows the link that realism makes be-
tween on the one hand ontological and logical matters, and on the 
other epistemological and psychological matters. Showing the fail-
ure of psychologists to see this link is central to realist critiques of 
psychology.  
 Anderson makes two main points: The first is the very general 
one that a relation, being between two or more terms, is distinct 
from and not part of those terms: Entities are not constituted by the 
relations into which they enter. This point is a logical or ontologi-
cal1 one. Its importance for psychology can hardly be overstated, 
because the second point is that cognition (like much of what psy-
chologists are interested in) is a relation, specifically a relation be-
tween the knower and the situation known. Anderson also argues 
that knowledge is propositional in that it is of situations, and situa-
tions are necessarily complex, things being of such and such a char-
acter, or of matters being related in some way. One cannot know “a 
thing”, simpliciter, the very least that one may know is that a thing is 
under certain conditions, a situation.  
 While today’s psychologists would think the targets of Anderson’s 
critique, Berkeley or Descartes, are quaint and removed from con-
temporary psychology, as later essays show, modern psychologists 
                                                             
1   For the realist these are identical in that logic is about the general forms 
of the world and not a calculus that sets out the rules of reasoning. 
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commit the same conceptual errors. There is something of a conti-
nuity of error from Descartes, through the 17th century empiricists’ 
“way of ideas” to modern psychology. As we commented earlier, it is 
routine, for example, to treat cognitions as things rather than rela-
tions between things, and to follow the language and practice of folk 
psychology of treating beliefs as things we have and that are in our 
minds—the common internalist view of mind. Indeed the main ac-
tivity of orthodox and cognitive psychology consists of populating 
the mind with cognitive entities: postulating them, measuring them, 
proposing hypotheses about their structure, sketching their sup-
posed role in causing behaviour, and even searching for their loca-
tion in the brain. But these cognitive entities—as opposed to the 
neural states that enable the person to enter into cognitive rela-
tions, or the neural states that obtain when the person is standing in 
those cognitive relations—will not be found. Consequently, the real 
relation, that of being conscious of something is abstracted to become 
the ineffable and inexplicable phenomenon of consciousness. Indeed, 
elsewhere Anderson has an essay called The Non Existence of Con-
sciousness (1929). Modern psychology’s ubiquitous mental represen-
tations, like Berkeley’s ideas, are constituted by their very role as 
objects of knowledge, yet simultaneously treated as if they are 
(mental) entities with dimensions that would make them fit, in 
proper scientific fashion, as causal structures. More generally, in the 
functionalist philosophy of cognitive science, hypothesised mental 
processes and entities are individuated and defined by the functions 
that they perform, that is, the relations into which they enter, fol-
lowing the same pattern of conflating relations and entities that 
Anderson identifies in Berkeley and Descartes. 
 In this early paper, Anderson introduces two further themes that 
are of especial relevance to psychology, because they deal with the 
relation between cognition and motivation. The first theme is the 
idea that the mind is not a unity. The phenomena of mental conflict 
and self-knowledge require, according to Anderson, a plurality of 
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knowers2. This raises the difficult question (which Anderson here 
notes but defers) of how we come to use the term “I” and of the illu-
sion of a single, unified self or mind. The second, related, theme is 
the relevance of the Freudian concepts of the unconscious and the 
wish. The knower, the subject term of the cognitive relation, is a 
desirer, pursuing states of affairs in the environment that will satisfy 
processes in his or her mind. In other words, there is no such thing 
as purely disinterested knowing - all cognition is motivated. These 
two themes reappear in several of the later essays, which discuss 
their implications for psychological theory and research. 
 In Chapter 5, The Concept of Attitude, John Maze shows the failure 
of psychology (still behaviourist at least in its terminology in 1973 
when the paper was first published) to account for motivational fac-
tors in action. He introduces a theme common in realist works, that 
a nonteleological account of motives is required to explain action, 
and he goes on to argue a point that is particularly prominent in his 
writings: that Freud’s drive theory has the best claim to a coherent 
analysis of motive. The pattern of this argument, which is given in 
different forms and with different emphases in several of the papers 
in this collection, takes up the same logical point that Anderson dis-
cusses in his essay, the distinction between things (terms) and the 
relations between them, and the fact that a thing cannot be consti-
tuted by its relations. Maze points out that the psychological notion 
of attitude as commonly construed involves an evaluative claim, 
namely, that whatever the attitude is directed towards possesses 
some good or value inherent to it. That is, there is something about 
the object such that one ought to feel this or that towards it. How-
ever, goods are always goods-for-someone, and indicate a real or 
supposed relation between the person and the object concerned. 
They are not properties of the object. Thus, the widely used concept 
of attitude involves pseudocognitive statements (“X is 
good/bad/right/wrong”, etc.), confuses relations with properties 
                                                             
2   Boag discusses this topic in Chapter 20. 
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and, impossibly, attempts to define a mental state in terms of the 
relations into which it may enter.   
 This paper also provides a good example of the affinity between 
realist analyses of psychological concepts and psychoanalysis, albeit 
not the popular view of psychoanalysis, but a psychoanalysis purged 
of Freud’s lapses into teleology. Maze asks, in effect, what is it that 
presses us to believe that some good (aesthetic or moral) is in the 
object, given that the logic of relations means it cannot be. His an-
swer is disguised motives, and he offers a Freudian account of these: 
Not only is psychoanalysis the strongest candidate in the field to 
account for unconscious motives, but Freud (though by no means all 
of his followers) clearly distinguishes between drives as motives and 
those objects which are empirically, contingently, found to bring 
about states of drive-satisfaction. In short, Freud’s theory, consis-
tent with the principle of nonconstitutive relations, distinguishes 
between the biological source of drive and the objects with which it 
enters into relation. In contrast to this, social and personality psy-
chology is replete with notions like attitude, set up on conceptually 
flawed and unexamined bases, and then treated as though in good 
scientific order they are fit to be treated as the causes of behaviour. 
The decades-long debate on the (causal) relation of attitudes to be-
haviour largely misses the point that the concept itself is logically 
incoherent, a reification of a relation. 
 The question of a deterministic theory of motivation is addressed 
in Chapter 6, the second of Maze’s essays in this collection, Drives 
and Consummatory Actions, which is the penultimate section of 
Maze’s 1983 book The Meaning of Behaviour. Although now more than 
twenty-five years old, this book is the most comprehensive realist 
attempt to deal with the ills and prospects of psychology. In the 
book Maze is concerned with “the basic psychological question 
‘Why did this person do that?’ ” (p. iii, quotation marks in original). 
And in the earlier sections of the book he has argued that psycholo-
gies that are teleological, that posit internal agents or the inherent 
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purposiveness of mind, cannot answer this question: They fail on 
grounds of incoherence and question-begging, depending as they do 
on the logically flawed view that the aspect of mind (purpose, 
choice, agent, self, etc.) claimed to bring about action has its aims as 
part of it, that is, is defined by its aims and so is constituted by the 
relations into which it enters. While the cognitive science that has, 
at least in theory, replaced such teleology has the virtue of attempt-
ing to treat cognition as part of an objective and determinist sci-
ence, its dependence on representational epistemology is similarly 
self-defeating. Cognition, on pain of incoherence, cannot be under-
stood as the internal representation of the world, but is rather a re-
lation between the organism and external states of affairs. Nor on 
its own can cognition account for action. For in order to account for 
action, one must go beyond the instrumental aspects of behaviour, 
perception, skills, development, analysis of abilities and so on, with 
which psychology concerns itself almost exclusively,3 and answer 
the question "but what are these for?". And to answer that question, 
one must combine an account recognising that cognition is a rela-
tion, with a proper, causal account of motive, one stripped of teleol-
ogy. This will tell us how the desire component in the formulation 
desire-plus-belief leads to action stands as a causal variable in the pro-
duction of behaviour. 
 Maze then sketches a causal account of motivation modelled on 
Freud’s theory of drives, albeit divested of some of Freud’s later 
speculative ideas on instinct, and compatible with modern physiol-
                                                             
3   Thus Johnson-Laird (1988 p. 27) says “The mind’s main tasks are: 
 to perceive the world 
 to learn, to remember and control actions 
 to cogitate and to create new ideas 
 to control communication with others 
 to create the experience of feelings, intentions and-self aware-
ness.” 
But there is no mention of what these might be for, nor of the role of psy-
chology in explaining why these instrumental processes occur. 
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ogy.4 Centres in the brain are hardwired and, switched on by preset 
stimuli, they drive specific, pre-programmed behaviours. Where 
those behaviours, through feedback, bring about the appropriate 
physiological consequences—also preset—the drive centre is 
switched off, and driven behaviour ceases. Learning is the accumu-
lation of information by these centres about what behavioural 
variations on the specific actions, and what objects, bring about the 
cessation of the drive excitation and the circumstances in which 
they do it.  
 The exact physiology or the number of drive centres is an empiri-
cal matter and does not affect the general form of Maze’s account. 
There are some deceptively important consequences of this formu-
lation. (1) It removes teleological accounts of purpose5 and the rep-
resentationism that is nowadays substituted for it, both incoherent. 
Drive is not defined by any aim: It seeks nothing, but in pure causal 
fashion sets in motion a specific action which, in the right circum-
stances, brings about the termination of the drive state through 
feedback, as say the action of sucking and swallowing may through 
changes in blood sugar levels. (2) It provides an account of the dis-
tinction between primary and derivative goals, terminating (in 
principle) the question "why did he do that?" with the statement of 
the primary drive action, in a way that agentive formulations can-
not. (3) It is a central state materialism in which mental processes 
are relations into which brain processes enter. This undercuts the 
whole presumption of contemporary psychology, namely that men-
tal processes are things that exist in the mind (or brain) and which 
can be specified and measured by psychologists. Cognitions or in-
                                                             
4   In the 25 years since Maze’s book, research on neuro-psychoanalysis has 
made the general form of Freud’s physiology even more plausible. Though 
of course the particular physiology is not necessary to the conceptual vi-
ability of the drive concept. 
5   Freud’s notion of drive is similarly nonteleological—despite his some-
times loose way of talking about it, and despite the routine interpretation 
by psychoanalysts of drive. 
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formation are secondary to drive in the sense that “each instinctual-
drive accumulates information and misinformation about the loca-
tion and means of acquisition of the objects necessary for its specific 
actions to be performed” (p.162). (4) This is a pluralistic, strongly 
partitive view of mind, which provides a basis for understanding 
phenomena such as the distinction between being conscious of 
events and being self-conscious (conscious of one’s consciousness), 
and repression. Moreover, it follows the point mentioned in Ander-
son’s essay that cognitive processes are always motivated, never 
fully disinterested and rational, an echo perhaps of Hume’s (1739) 
Treatise, “Reason is … the slave of the passions, and can never pre-
tend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Bk. II, Part 
III, Sect. 3). 
 First-time readers sometimes miss the depth and complexity of 
the analysis in Maze, perhaps because of his elegantly condensed 
style of writing. In fact we might note that the ability to summarise 
complex arguments and ideas in psychology, and pick the eyes out 
of it, or a body of literature, is something that Maze and at least 
some other realist authors possess. This may be in part a conse-
quence of the mettle developed in having to articulate and defend 
the minority position of realism against established opinion, but it is 
also a consequence of practising the realist principle that logical 
testing of a theory must have priority over empirical or experimen-
tal test. The clarity and directness of this realism is mirrored in the 
ability to disinter the essential points and arguments (including the 
inconsistencies) of those positions under analysis. And Maze, like 
some of his fellow realists, is prepared to say that the emperor, 
however grand, is naked, and that his suit of new ideas covers noth-
ing. 
 In Chapter 7, as his title, Maze’s Direct Realism and the Character of 
Cognition, suggests, Joel Michell reviews major themes in Maze’s 
work, concentrating on cognition and its central place in psychol-
ogy, and in doing so he fleshes out some realist themes and their 
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implications for psychology. Michell also provides, as he generally 
does in his work, the historical threads that led to the positions he 
discusses. His review is a reminder, still true today, that much of 
realism’s promise has yet to be realised. Not only have psychologists 
generally not tried to build theories consistent with realist require-
ments, the realist requirements themselves have not been fully set 
out. Indeed, Michell’s paper reads like a programme for realist psy-
chology, and several of his ideas have been taken up in later work, 
including in some of the later papers in this collection. Realist 
analysis, as discussed earlier, is not being touted as a “new para-
digm”—the core at least of realism is immanent in rational dis-
course—but no one should underestimate just how deeply the cri-
tiques cut, nor how profound a reconfiguration of psychology’s pro-
gramme is entailed. Michell’s review is then a reminder, as he says, 
of how radical realism is, for example in rejecting the ubiquitous 
information-processing view on grounds of incoherence. We have 
almost to begin again to develop accounts of cognition and motiva-
tion that are not shot through with the confusions of representa-
tionism. 
 Given that cognition is, as Anderson puts it, a relation between a 
knower and a known, the issue for the realist is what is the nature of 
the subjects, the objects (the terms of the relation), and the relation 
of cognition. These are the elements of the cognitive situation that 
we introduced in Chapter 1. Michell nicely comments that “Maze 
takes the subject matter of psychology to be the study of how cogni-
tion shapes behaviour in the service of the instinctual drives.” 6 He 
reviews Maze’s critique of representationist theories of cognition, 
namely that cognitive representations are logically incoherent. The 
issue of representation can be articulated as that of how do cogni-
tive representations get their meaning, because representationism 
requires that when a person knows something in the world this is a 
                                                             
6   Illustrations of this may be seen in the several essays by Maze in this 
collection. 
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two part process; the person knows/accesses the representation, 
and the representation refers to or represents the state of affairs. 
The representationist story is appealing because often persons 
think that they know something in the world and it turns out that 
they are mistaken. In such cases it is taken that the person-
representation part of knowing has occurred normally, but the rep-
resentation-world part has gone awry. It is the latter that makes the 
cognition nonveridical. The fatal flaw in this model is that the rep-
resentation-world part of cognising, where it is held that a repre-
sentation refers to the state of affairs, while it appears to draw on 
the ordinary sense of reference, in fact does not. When a symbol 
properly refers to something (the example given is “red” referring 
to the appropriately coloured things), one must know the symbol, 
the symbolised entity, and the fact that the symbol is used to refer 
to the symbolised thing. 7 This is how “red” gets its meaning. In the 
arrangement that representationism depicts, the person does not, 
in fact cannot, know both the representation and the thing it refers 
to for that was exactly what the theory was designed to answer in 
the first place, yet that is also just what would be required for repre-
sentation. The theory is circular. 
 A central point made by Michell is that the support which repre-
sentationists get from the computer analogy also fails. Michell goes 
beyond Maze’s view that computers do not really cognise. He argues 
that if computers represent they do so in a way different from how 
cognitive representations are supposed to represent. The com-
puter’s internal states may be attributed meaning, of course, be-
cause they can be interpreted by a programmer or user as words, 
moves in games and many other things. But this would in any case 
be a form of standard, extrinsic reference, for that is the only kind of 
reference possible: Something stands for or refers to something else 
by virtue of their being two independent things where one is taken 
                                                             
7   See Agnes Petocz’s essay on a realist account of symbolism (Chapter 16, 
this volume) for further discussion of symbolism as a three-term relation. 
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to indicate the other, by a third party. Thus, computer states do not 
have intrinsic meaning or content, as cognitive representations are 
supposed to have. That is, they do not have specific and unique con-
tent, refer only to one thing, what they are about, or mean. Indeed, 
the idea of intrinsic meaning or reference, where the content is 
within the referring term of the reference is another example of the 
fallacy of constitutive relations and is simply incoherent. It col-
lapses a relation into a term. Therefore, the computer may well be 
used to model the neural processes underlying cognition, but it fails 
as an existence proof of cognitive representation; in fact, it is an exis-
tence proof that cognitive representations cannot possibly involve 
intrinsic reference.  
 Michell also deals with Maze’s argument for the plurality of 
knowers in the one person; his thesis that the knowers are drives, 
physiologically characterised; that the objects of cognition are pro-
positional, in the sense that they are objective situations, always a 
matter of something being a certain kind or something being re-
lated in a particular way to other things. He also treats Maze’s thesis 
concerning the observability of cognition. Since to observe a rela-
tion one must observe both the terms that are related, realists must 
reject both the traditional view that only one’s own mental states 
are observable and the internalist view that cognition consists of 
observing some inner state like a representation—a view that ulti-
mately makes knowledge of other minds impossible. Instead the 
realist must develop an account of what it is to observe another’s 
entering into a cognitive relation where both the terms of the rela-
tion, the subject and object of the cognition, are observed. Michell 
then expands on Maze’s view that we can in many situations ob-
serve another’s beliefs in the causal texture of his or her movements 
in relation to the environment. That is, other minds are not locked 
behind the screen of our representations of them, for the phenom-
ena “in” other minds are in fact relations between the organism and 
objective states of affairs, relations which may in principle be ob-
served. 
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 Though Michell does not discuss it here (but cf. Michell, in press), 
the view that one can observe directly the cognitions of others is in 
opposition to another widespread thesis in recent psychology, one 
that arrives together with the constructivist epistemology of infor-
mation processing. This is the idea that human social interaction 
depends on the possession of a theory of mind, that is, on the con-
struction of a set of explanatory hypotheses about others’ beliefs 
and desires and their role in the production of behaviour, and that 
such a theory is required because all knowledge of other minds is 
necessarily indirect. 
 Michell also goes on to make some suggestions about the thorny 
problem of error (see also Rantzen, Chapter 10 in this collection). 
Much of the justification of constructivist, indirect, accounts of 
knowledge, and so the representationism of contemporary psychol-
ogy, comes from the fact of error. From Descartes to cognitive be-
havioural therapy it is held that mistaken perception or false belief 
can only be explained as a failure of the constructed, inner repre-
sentation to match the external thing it represents. While this 
popular account is fatally flawed (the indirect theory of knowledge, 
by disallowing access to the object, allows no means to compare it to 
its representation) the realist still needs to say what error consists 
of: If we perceive directly, what is being perceived when we misper-
ceive, given that a realist cannot hold that it is an actual situation? 
Michell proposes that error consists not of the cognition of some 
state of affairs but of the failure to cognise, an inhibition—perhaps 
motivated—of cognitions, or an ignoring of facts, and that this 
makes it appear as if a person is perceiving a non-existent state of 
affairs 
 Michell’s review is valuable because it shows just how radical are 
realism’s implications for psychology in the hands of a critic like 
Maze. One by one the assumptions of orthodox psychology are ex-
posed and examined for their coherence, and found wanting: the 
internalist view of mind; the representationist, indirect view of 
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cognition; the view of other minds as necessarily non-observable; 
and the overly cognitive (motivationless) accounts of behaviour.  
 Part 3, CRITIQUES AND DEVELOPMENTS, consists of a series of 
papers that give realist analyses of a whole range of psychological 
concepts and theories. The first four papers, Chapters 8 to 11, deal 
with the nature of concepts, the argument for the computational 
model of mind, the problem of error, and the idea of class or cate-
gory. These may appear, at first blush, to be specialist matters and 
the general psychologist may not be familiar with the complex ar-
guments that produce the stance that orthodox psychology takes on 
them. Nevertheless, they have consequences throughout psychol-
ogy. For example, any psychology that talks of mental concepts 
rests on a view of what concepts are and how they are attained. Any 
account of cognition must deal with illusion, truth and error. Any 
account or use of classification makes assumptions about the nature 
of class and category. Chapter 12 enters the methodological heart of 
psychology, addressing the question of the quantitative nature of 
psychological variables, and it too has profound implications for 
psychology’s assumptions and measurement practices. The remain-
ing chapters, 13 to 23, move into other areas: accounts of meaning 
and knowledge (Chapters 15, 17, 18, 19), the requirements for a the-
ory of symbolism and symbolic activity (16), the problem of mental 
causation (22, 23), the unity of mind (20), drives and affects (21, 23), 
clinical and applied psychology (15, 19), method and the role of 
qualitative approaches (18, 19), and critiques of social construction-
ism and post structuralism (13, 14, 15, 17). Together, these essays 
reveal the systematic and general nature of the realist programme. 
 Terry McMullen’s “Out There”, Not “In Here”: A Realist Account of 
Concepts (Chapter 8) examines the use of concept in experimental 
psychology—though it should be noted that a similar account of 
concepts is used in various applied areas such as educational and 
developmental psychology that are not alway experimental. 
McMullen points out that psychologists, excepting behaviourists, 
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take an internalist and abstractionist view of concepts: This is that 
the mind abstracts general features from a set of elements, or con-
crete instances, and so “acquires” concepts—mental classes or cate-
gories representing the elements. In this internalist, abstractionist 
model, acquiring a concept means establishing a mental structure. 
This is the familiar talk of modern psychology: The newborn pos-
sesses no concepts—or, by analogy in an experiment, the experi-
mental subject does not have the particular concept whose acquisi-
tion is under investigation—and the story to be told is how in the 
process of learning concepts the child or subject turns concrete sen-
sory elements into meaningful and of course internal representa-
tions of classes and categories of thing. This is the view of concepts 
as representational structures in here. 
 McMullen argues that this received view suffers from several re-
lated conceptual problems: the self-contradictory nature of repre-
sentationist theory (which other papers in this collection also deal 
with); a homuncular and viciously regressive account of the mean-
ing (reference) of the symbols involved; an incoherent reification of 
concepts; and a dualism as conceptually problematic as Descartes’. 
But the foundation of the abstractionist view is a logical and onto-
logical error: the view that there can be “simples”, “semantic par-
ticulars” that form the basis of mental schemata. And this error is 
an instance of the more general failure to grasp that everything 
knowable or speakable must be complex and propositional. The ab-
stractionist theory, widespread in modern cognitivism, requires 
that there be irreducible atoms of experience supplied by the world, 
and it is the activity of the mind that associates these simples into 
complex concepts or ideas. In this respect contemporary cognitiv-
ism continues the idealist, associationist tradition of Hume and oth-
ers. Of course, modern theories use different and apparently more 
scientific terminology: Hume’s “simple perceptions” become “se-
mantic primitives” in Anderson and Bower (1979). Nonetheless, 
what is required for associations even to start are concepts (e.g., 
“sameness”) of the very sort whose genesis from non-concepts 
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(meaningless sensory inputs) the theory is designed to explain. The 
cognitivist or associationist mind needs to have been pre-primed 
with concepts in order to acquire concepts—a matter that some 
cognitivists like Fodor seem at least to see and attempt to overcome 
by using a nativist strategy (see the following chapter by Maze). The 
realist account of concepts avoids these problems and obviates the 
need to think up “solutions” to them: Situations, the objects of 
knowledge, are already complex and propositional. There are no in-
divisible “elements” to be linked by mind.  
 The traditional theory of the association of ideas is, of course, an 
attempt to answer the semantic question of how we acquire mean-
ing. This is something that becomes acute in this era of the syntac-
tic, computational model of mind, and in that context the issue is 
about how one synthesises, bootstraps, meaning from non-
meaningful elements by the application of purely syntactic proce-
dures. McMullen takes the sort of critique he has mounted against 
associationism and applies it in some detail against the possibility of 
such bootstrapping, in any of its variants, in information-processing 
theory, connectionism, or any other. The task that psychologists 
have set themselves (it is perhaps information-processing psychol-
ogy’s central problem), that of showing how mind can abstract or 
construct meaning from meaningless “atoms”, concepts from non 
concepts, is futile: It is only “required” because psychologists’ on-
tology, and relatedly epistemology, holds that what exist, the ob-
jects of knowledge, are pure particulars. The answer the abstrac-
tionist provides simply begs the question, assuming the possession 
of the very concepts whose genesis it is supposedly explaining. Once 
it is grasped that the least and most that may be known is already 
propositional, it will be realised that concepts, like all objects of 
knowledge, are, as McMullen concludes “so to speak ‘out there’. 
They are not internal reifications, representative mental entities, 
built up according to an impossible story of abstraction.” 
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 Maze, in the third of his essays in this collection Representationism, 
Realism and the Redundancy of ‘Mentalese’ (Chapter 9) goes to the heart 
of what has come to be the scientific pride of psychology in the last 
half century: the development of cognitive science and the thesis 
that the mind may be understood in computational terms. At the 
centre of the computational model is representationism. This is the 
view that cognition, in which we must include perception, aware-
ness and any apprehension of the world, consists of representing 
external entities or processes by some sort of mental tokens or 
symbols; that thinking, remembering and higher mental functions 
then consist in operating on those internal symbols—hence the 
ubiquitous phrase cognitive processing; and that behaviour is guided 
by the processed cognitive representations (beliefs). This is an indi-
rect theory of knowledge in that all knowledge of the external 
world is mediated, is of representations of things, and is not knowl-
edge of things themselves, to which we have no direct access. The 
computer is taken to be both a model for constructing theories of 
cognition, and a justification of the representationist epistemology 
that underpins cognitive modelling: If computers can “process in-
formation” by operating on symbolic representations of external 
events according to rules, then in principle minds can do the same, 
and it is the business of psychology to find out how this happens.  
 In spite of conceptual quibbles at the margins and some in-house 
differences about the best way to articulate the position, and ex-
actly how representations might be embodied, a broad computa-
tional/representational view of mind remains the establishment 
position in empirical psychology, even when it is claimed by some 
cognitive scientists that they have “moved beyond” (the old Fodor 
style of) computationalism into, for example, neural networks or 
dynamical systems theory. It would be almost impossible to over-
state the importance of this computational/representational thesis 
to modern psychology. It is the very backbone of most empirical 
theory, experimentation and application. Even areas like personal-
ity, clinical, or social psychology, outside of the main cognitive sci-
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ence domains of perception, language, memory, cognition and so 
on, have come to understand and articulate their ideas in these 
terms. It is an orthodoxy that the advent of the computational 
model of cognitive science is what enables psychology to be scien-
tific without reducing it to mere behaviourism; that is, has delivered 
a genuine science of mind. This conception of cognitive science is so 
basic to modern psychology that challenges to it are seen by almost 
all psychologists who think of themselves as scientific not as dis-
agreements over how best to be scientific about mind, but as oppo-
sition to the possibility of scientific psychology—perhaps a senti-
mental rejection of the supposed dehumanizing view of the person 
involved in comparing it to a computing mechanism—and relegated 
to the unscientific fringes of psychology. Given how entrenched is 
computational representationism in mainstream psychology, it is 
worth presenting a somewhat extended commentary on Maze’s ar-
guments in this classic paper.  
 Maze argues that, even in the modern versions employed in cog-
nitive science, representationism falls into solipsism, and provides 
neither the basis for distinguishing true from false cognitions, nor a 
satisfactory account of inference. Therefore, it is not the proper ba-
sis for a science of mind. Further, he examines Fodor’s (1975) influ-
ential “linguistic” version of representation in which an innate lan-
guage, mentalese, with its stock of rudimentary concepts is held to be 
needed both to learn any natural language and to cross the other-
wise insurmountable gap between “meaningless” stimuli and mean-
ingful cognitions. Maze argues that only a direct account of knowl-
edge can rectify the deficiencies of representationism. 
 Now Maze agrees with Fodor both on the centrality of cognition 
to psychology and in wanting to establish a causal, scientific deter-
minist account of mind. He has no wish to attack the computational 
model on the grounds of any supposed failure to fully encompass 
human agency. Rather, Maze wants to show that representationism 
is incoherent and cannot be part of a sound science of mind. Mod-
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ern cognitive-science representationists like Fodor generally be-
lieve, if they have considered the matter, that somehow their repre-
sentationism overcomes the long-known and fatal objections to tra-
ditional representationism (the thesis that all knowledge is of rep-
resentations of things, and not of things themselves), namely: It 
leads to solipsism because we are restricted to knowing only what is 
inside our own minds; it is incoherent because it makes reference to 
things themselves while denying the possibility of knowledge of 
their existence; and even if there were some a priori reason to be-
lieve in an external world we could not distinguish between true 
and false beliefs, between how we represent the world to ourselves 
and the actual case, because there is no means of checking the latter 
independently of the former.  
 The reason that cognitive scientists like Fodor consider that they 
escape from these objections is, as Maze points out, that they see 
mental processes as embedded in a causal world and they regard 
themselves as engaged in the scientific task of tracing the causal 
links between external events, the stimulation of sensory organs, 
the transformation of stimuli from external sources into represen-
tations of those sources, and the operations on those representa-
tions that produce the complex cognitive states that guide action. 
And of course it is taken for fact that each step in this causal pro-
gression is real and material—it is not that cognitive science em-
braces mind-body dualism. So, because, there is a causal connection 
from the external world to mind there is no solipsism.  
 Maze deals with this defence against solipsism by pointing out 
that the very talk of external objects from which the causal chain 
derives is simply not allowed by representationism. As long as indi-
rect perception is a universal principle (and it clearly is in the for-
mulations of Fodor and others) there is for the representationist no 
access to such objects except via representations. Only by denying 
representationism and accepting direct realism can they consis-
tently talk of the elements in the causal chain that they investigate. 
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 There is curious “mote and beam” aspect to another of the repre-
sentationists’ reasons for rejecting direct realism, the realist’s han-
dling of the problem of error (see Rantzen, Chapter 10 in this collec-
tion). The indirect account of knowledge upon which cognitive sci-
ence depends, and other criticisms of direct realism, draw aid and 
comfort from the supposed problem that direct realism has with 
error. There is a common but incorrect assumption that direct real-
ism is committed to the idea that perception or belief is correct, that 
it cannot be wrong. And, since it is clear that beliefs can be false, this 
is taken to show that direct realism is mistaken. Indeed, the puzzle 
of perceptual illusion was a spur to the development of perception 
theory, and the fact of mistaken belief is taken to lead naturally to 
and justify representationism by treating false beliefs as misrepre-
sentations of external facts: Facts are stable and incorrigible, but if 
beliefs are representations then they are variable and corrigible and 
that is where error may enter. Maze points out, however, that far 
from resolving the problem of misrepresentation and error, repre-
sentationism in any form is unable to cope either with true and false 
belief or with the distinction between them. Even if some a priori 
justification or divine revelation established the existence of a mind 
independent world, the problem of knowing whether a particular 
belief was true or not would still be there for the representationist. 
Unless at some point we have direct access to facts, there can be no 
confirmation or disconfirmation of representations of states of af-
fairs in the world.  
 Maze then turns more specifically to Fodor’s version of represen-
tationism in which the latter argues that it is necessary to have a 
language within which to represent external objects and events, and 
indeed to learn a natural language: That is, there is a language of 
thought, mentalese. This mentalese constitutes the basic semantic 
units from which the acquisition of natural language and knowledge 
proceeds. More generally, cognitive psychologists take it that when 
in an act of cognition we go from sensory input to perhaps basic 
representations to a properly formed belief like “there is a robin on 
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the lawn”, two sources of information are involved: the sensory in-
put and a stock of information in the mind prior to the act of appre-
hension. The two together and some sort of matching process are 
supposed to enable the belief. Psychological theory is replete with 
the postulated internal entities supposed to bear this pre-perceptual 
information, schemata, scripts, constructs, templates etc. The lan-
guage-of-thought hypothesis sets up the stock of innately given, 
prior information needed by the Fodorian mind, not just for a par-
ticular act of perception, but to allow any perception or knowledge 
whatsoever. Although Fodor might be reluctant to think of these as 
innate ideas, it is clearly a nativist position and what is innate is se-
mantic—or there would be no point to this hypothesis. Of course, 
the problem of how this background knowledge was established and 
biologically hardwired, given that for Fodor there never is or was or 
could be any direct access to fact in the evolving organism, is the 
same as that of the acquisition of current knowledge in any indirect 
epistemology. Again, Maze’s point is that all these arguments in 
support of representationism repeatedly beg the question: They 
smuggle in premises that require the very direct knowledge that 
representationism denies, or accept as given something that is in-
explicable within the terms of representationism. They are incoher-
ent. 
 Maze does not offer the kind of detailed argument and evidence 
for a cognitive science embodying direct realism that the represen-
tationist does for orthodoxy. He could not: Representationism has 
been so dominant that non-representationist psychology is neces-
sarily at the beginning. What he aims to establish, then, are the ba-
sic requirements of an account of knowledge that any psychology 
must incorporate if it is not to fall foul of the logical problems of 
representationism. These are that humans are able to gain direct 
knowledge of (come to stand in a cognitive relation to) objects in 
the world, though we know little about how our complex neurology 
enables this, and of course we won’t investigate in these terms unless 
we abandon the search for representations. It follows that cognitive 
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processes such as reasoning do not consist of internal operations on 
mental/neural symbols according to rules (though they may fit 
rules) but in perceiving aspects of the world’s structure, for exam-
ple, that a particular situation (a conclusion) must obtain if certain 
other situations (the premises) obtain. Thus, for any intellectually 
honest cognitive scientist the undoing of representationism should 
mean a complete rethink of psychological science. But as Maze says 
“Psychological science is sufficiently advanced to enable one to pre-
dict that the arguments of this paper will not be greeted with glad 
assent by those whose academic careers have been invested in rep-
resentationist cognitive science” (p. 179). And two decades after the 
paper’s publication representationist cognitive science proceeds 
apace. 
 Andy Rantzen’s chapter, Constructivism, Direct Realism and the 
Nature of Error, (Chapter 10) continues with the matter raised by 
Maze: the long-standing issue of error and how realism can deal 
with it. This issue has two aspects: The first is, given that realism 
holds that perception is direct, of things or situations and not of 
representations or ideas of things, how can it account for the fact of 
error, where a person believes something to be the case but that 
situation does not obtain. For example, in the case of perceptual 
illusions, what might be the “object” of the false belief? The second 
issue has to do with the confusion between direct and certain or in-
disputable knowledge. It is often assumed by critics that the realist 
account of cognition must mean that this yields certain or indubita-
ble knowledge and, particularly infuriating for the critics, that real-
ists consider themselves to be in possession of that certain knowl-
edge. It is sometimes held in contrast that a nonrealist, constructiv-
ist epistemology not only allows for error but that it promotes the 
virtue of tolerance in domains like psychotherapy by conceding that 
everyone’s perception is equally correct.  
 Rantzen is concerned with the first of these issues, but not the 
second (which is discussed by Mackay in Chapter 15, and in less de-
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tail by Maze in Chapter 13). Rantzen sets out the orthodox position 
on perception and cognition in contemporary cognitive science, and 
shows that it is constructivist in that it holds that the brain con-
structs knowledge of external situations from the limited and often 
deficient data that are presented to the senses, building intermedi-
ary representations of the world. This process is taken to be through 
symbol manipulation and indeed inference from the data. The exter-
nal world, if perceived at all, is perceived indirectly. The direct ob-
jects of perception—or, more generally, of knowledge—are repre-
sentations. If the representation correctly depicts the world, it is 
veridical; if not, it is error. In most constructivist views this is 
touted as a solution to the problem of error. So much so that it is 
considered fact by most of psychology. The constructivist criticism 
of realism is then that it has no means for explaining error because 
direct perception of external situations does not allow for a domain 
containing the false or mismatched “perception”. 
 In one sense, though Rantzen doesn’t emphasise this, the realist 
has no case to answer, for the supposed alternative position con-
tains a fatal logical flaw, as has been pointed out repeatedly, and so 
could not possibly be correct: If all cognition is indirect, as construc-
tivists hold, there is no means of establishing correspondence be-
tween any representation (including of course the representation of 
the putative fact that “all cognition is indirect”) and the repre-
sented fact (including that all cognition is indeed indirect). Thus the 
constructionist has to abandon the notion of truth—and hence er-
ror—or recast truth as inconsistency between representations or 
some such formula. As this slides into relativism, the realist might 
justifiably feel that the constructivist has no business accusing any-
one of an inadequate account of error. 
 Yet there is more to it than this, and Rantzen attempts to criticise 
and improve on the sketchy accounts of error in the realist litera-
ture. Realism is still faced with the problem that, as cognition is a 
relation between a person and situation, in the case of error, where 
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there is no situation to cognise, then either we are left with the im-
possibility of a single-term relation or misperception needs to be 
understood as a process different from perception. It is not simply 
perception gone wrong. Following O’Neil (1958) Rantzen discusses 
the apparent classes of cognitive error, those of omission and those 
of commission. In omission the correct perception is unavailable to 
the person either because of the deficiency of the perceptual appa-
ratus or the inadequacy of the information coming from the envi-
ronment. In commission, in spite of the availability of appropriate 
apparatus and information, the perceiver neglects this and fails to 
correctly cognise the situation. 
 Rantzen takes up Michell’s suggestion (Chapter 7 in this collec-
tion; and 1988) that some sort of inhibition may be at work here—
once again pointing to the importance of motivation so neglected 
by contemporary cognitive science. Rantzen takes part of this sug-
gestion and argues that error, instead of being perception or cogni-
tion gone wrong, is in fact some sort of non-perception or non-
cognition, a mechanism different from perception, such that mis-
perception or error and cognition are asymmetrical. He outlines a 
hierarchical theory which rejects and replaces the notion of errors 
of commission in favour of an account of multiple errors of omis-
sion. The theory is based on the realist requirements that cognition 
is of external situations rather than of representations, and that the 
criterion for veridical cognition is the truth of that cognition. 
Rantzen argues that the failure to cognise correctly comes about 
because of either environmental or organismic obstacles to cogni-
tion, not the failure of inference from deficient information. 
 Rantzen describes errors of commission as second-order errors of 
omission. There are in his account three sorts of situation where a 
person fails to cognise some fact: simple lack of opportunity to cog-
nise; some inability to cognise because of the nature of the percep-
tual processes or set-up; and where cognition is inhibited. All these 
are errors of omission. In contrast, errors of commission, typically 
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described as false beliefs, Rantzen argues are second-order errors of 
omission. This is where the person not only has failed to cognise 
some fact, but in addition has failed to cognise that first failure. He 
notes that the two-stage process may be the result of inhibition. 
More generally, any error of omission, of any type, may be com-
pounded by another, second error of omission to do with the first 
error, that is, an error of perception about the error of perception. 
And this is in effect an error of commission. 
 Here, something needs to be said about J. J. Gibson because Gib-
son’s account of perception (Gibson, 1950) is mentioned in several of 
the papers, including Rantzen’s. The reason for this is that Gibson’s 
metatheory, his direct-realist account of perception, is compatible 
with the realist account of cognition: But Gibson’s theory consid-
ered overall is both a realist metatheory and a theory of the means 
and mechanisms of perception, and of course many different theo-
ries might be compatible with the one metatheory. In using Gibson’s 
direct realism to discuss the issue of perception and error, the real-
ist should be taken to endorse the metatheory without necessarily 
endorsing the particulars of Gibson’s theory, which must be judged 
empirically as well. That Gibson’s direct realism is a challenge to the 
metatheory of contemporary cognitive psychology is indicated 
when Rantzen mentions “Fodor and Pylyshyn’s 58-page polemic 
against Gibsonian realism”. 
 Psychology, not just cognitive psychology, is necessarily con-
cerned with the apprehension and organisation of knowledge, and 
must depend on accounts of category, concept and class. In Chapter 
11, Phil Sutcliffe’s (1993) paper, Concept, Class, and Category in the Tra-
dition of Aristotle offers a defence of the Aristotelian account of class 
and category on the grounds of inescapable realism. He starts by 
pointing out that the logical evaluation of theory has priority over 
its empirical test. A theory has to satisfy logical requirements before 
it is empirically assessable, and if a theory fails logical test and is 
logically compromised, it is untenable a priori and so empirical test 
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and observations are irrelevant. Many psychologists mistakenly 
think that logical issues may be resolved through empirical observa-
tion. This error is perhaps one of the reasons why conceptual work 
in psychology is so often seen as valueless, and perhaps why empiri-
cal psychologists are unmoved by even the most incisive logical cri-
tiques of theory and method.8 Sutcliffe’s paper is an extended ex-
ample of this point, how logical requirements constrain the psycho-
logical account one may give of such things as class, categorization 
and concept. We have seen that realist critiques, such as those of-
fered by Maze and others, often aim to show that the positions they 
attack require the very concepts that the positions claim to have 
dispensed with (e.g., indirect theories of cognition need the possibil-
ity of direct cognition to avoid solipsism and recognise error). Sut-
cliffe employs the same strategy: He argues that proposed modern 
replacements of the realist, Aristotelian view of class and category 
require exactly that classical view which they deny, and upon which 
the supposedly alternative, modern theories—the kind now fashion-
able in psychology—are based.  
 Sutcliffe’s arguments are close, detailed and cover some of the 
history of these fundamental logical notions, as a basis for later dis-
cussion of psychology’s use of them. He outlines the Aristotelian 
tradition, from Aristotle (384 BC – 322) through Porphyry (234 AD – 
c. 305) to the Port-Royal logicians, Arnauld (1612 -1694) and Nicole 
(1625 - 1695), that a concept has intension and extension. Logically, 
the intension of a concept is the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for something to be of its kind, and the extension is all and only 
those objects (the class) satisfying the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions given in the intension of that concept. This conception flows 
                                                             
8   One of the authors was astonished to hear a very distinguished experi-
mental psychologist, when a symposium participant pointed out that his 
explanation of a cognitive phenomenon was fundamentally homuncular, 
reply: “I don’t have a problem with that” and continue his exposition! He 
clearly believed that this response was an adequate rebuttal of a concep-
tual charge. 
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from the realist view that every existent thing has properties that 
may be predicated of it, and each property is of some thing or class 
of things. Thus the objects to which a term refers constitute its ex-
tension/denotation, and the properties that define it are its inten-
sion/connotation. But, as we have seen from McMullen’s essay 
(Chapter 8 in this collection), logical concepts are, in the hands of 
psychologists, given a new interpretation. The realist, ontological 
basis of logical words such as class, concept, intension and exten-
sion, namely that they refer to states of affairs, is undermined, and 
psychologists use them as though concepts, classes and categories 
are purely mental structures, constructed by minds to interpret the 
world. 
 The psychologists’ use of these notions is compatible with the 
trend in recent years to undermine the Aristotelian view. Some lo-
gicians and psychologists argue that the traditional view of category 
is inadequate, and they attempt to construct accounts of category 
based on ideas of prototype, or Wittgenstein’s9 "family resem-
blance" view. In part this is supposed to allow for the genuine fuzzi-
ness of human concept learning, but behind this is a pervasive con-
structivism of varying degrees whose position is that things, prop-
erties and kinds are not in the world but in the minds (in schemata, 
for example) of the beholder. It is of course often those in the hard 
nosed end of psychology, involved in the experimental investigation 
of perception and reasoning, who are interested in specifying the 
exact nature of notions like class and category. But many of these 
otherwise scientifically-minded workers slip into non-realist ac-
counts.  
 Sutcliffe painstakingly applies a common realist strategy, to show 
not that those who claim to have overcome and replaced the classi-
cal accounts are “not realist” but that, in setting out their modern 
                                                             
9   Maze (in Chapter 13 of this collection) and Hibberd (Chapter 14) simi-
larly point out problems in an associated Wittgensteinian idea of meaning 
as use, a principle adopted by social constructionists. 
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substitutes for the traditional view, they assume the very (realist) 
concepts that they are supposedly replacing. For example, a number 
of classificatory systems attempt to replace monotypic (monothetic) 
with polytypic (polythetic) definitions of class. That is, they attempt 
to do away with the idea that a class of things is defined by neces-
sary and sufficient properties of those things, perhaps to make it 
suitable for computational procedures for clustering. They might, 
for example, use resemblance of some of a class’s members to other 
members, and a different resemblance of those members to yet other 
members to define membership of a class, polythetically. The class 
is then made up of a family or members with various not necessarily 
wholly shared features.  
 While one can make up such classifications easily enough, Sut-
cliffe points out that each attempt to construct an alternative ac-
count of classification starts with a demarcation, say, between the 
objects of concern and those not of concern, that cannot but use the 
traditional monothetic classification, namely one in which a class of 
objects is distinguished from another by virtue of the possession, or 
not, of certain necessary and sufficient properties. A polythetic clas-
sificatory system cannot be universal because it depends on the tra-
ditional monothetic concept of class. Sutcliffe presents a variety of 
arguments on the idea of the polythetic class, each showing that 
polythetic formulations of concept, class and category and related 
concepts are de facto monothetic. 
 Putting the matter as neutrally as one can, when dealing with the 
psychology of concepts, say where a person learns, acquires, em-
ploys or, in casual psychological talk, “has” a concept, we are always 
dealing with the pairing of the person with a concept. And an ade-
quate psychological account of this process of “pairing” must then 
include an adequate account of the concepts themselves; must spec-
ify clearly what are the subjects of inquiry, that is, say what is a 
concept, a class, and a category—something that many psychologi-
cal theories fail to do. Sutcliffe then turns to psychological treat-
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ments of concept and category that have conceptual similarities to 
the logical theories that he has criticised. He draws on Rosch’s pro-
totype theory (1988; Rosch & Mervis, 1998) as an example of an in-
fluential “modern” and cognitive approach to the psychology of 
concepts. This approach, following similar themes in mathematical 
and philosophical theories of class, concept and category, holds that 
traditional Aristotelian, intensional, means of specifying a class—by 
giving necessary and sufficient conditions for membership—is in-
adequate, and needs to be replaced or at least heavily revised, by 
the importation of a family resemblance or prototype and exten-
sional means of class specification. In the latter a class is somehow 
based on or best exemplified by a prototypical member, but none-
theless contains a range of perhaps poorer fit members that do not 
share an identical set of necessary and sufficient properties to de-
fine the class. As we move away from the prototype, the members of 
the class become increasingly less typical and at its “borders” the 
class is fuzzy, without the clear cut boundaries that an intensional 
definition gives them. This account of class and category is taken to 
fit the psychological facts, and the person in the act of categorising 
is held to make a threshold judgment that an object is sufficiently 
close to the prototype to count as a member of its family. Though 
there is no suggestion that Rosch or other modern accounts intends 
this, it is suitable to models of mind that treat the mind as imposing 
categories on the world. 
 Sutcliffe’s response is to show through a series of demonstrations 
that, notwithstanding the practical difficulties that may arise in 
specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership 
of any particular class, the application of prototypic and polythetic 
judgments always depends upon exactly the sort of monothetic dis-
criminations that they are supposed to replace. There is no worka-
ble polythetic means for defining class membership. He concludes 
with an argument that for a person to “have a concept” is for that 
person to know the state of affairs that is the intension-cum-
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extension of the concept, a state of affairs that exists independently 
of mind and whose properties are apprehended in learning. 
 In Chapter 12, Normal Science, Pathological Science and Psychometrics, 
Joel Michell makes a powerful attack on the very heartland of psy-
chology’s scientific pretensions: measurement. The realist tradition 
is to stress normal science as critical inquiry rather than as any par-
ticular set of methods and procedures (as commonly conceived in 
the education of mainstream psychologists), or as a social activity 
characterised by working on problems from within a paradigm 
(Kuhn, 1962)—as commonly conceived since Kuhn’s thesis by the 
opponents of the mainstream. Error and even breakdowns—where 
theories are wrongly accepted as true and there is no serious at-
tempt to test them—are inevitable in science because science is dif-
ficult and scientists are fallible, cognitively limited, motivated, 
swayed by ideological and commercial factors and so on. However, 
these are not pathological; the self-critical spirit and associated 
methods of science are a corrective, and this error-correction is 
normal science. Indeed it is the self-critical procedures, logical and 
empirical test, and not merely the inquiring attitude, nor immunity 
from error and breakdown, that distinguishes science from other 
forms of enquiry. But Michell argues that there are situations when 
science becomes pathological. This is when to a breakdown or error 
is added a higher-order breakdown: when, added to the error of ac-
cepting a false hypothesis, there is the refusal to test it, shaped by a 
higher-order, uncritical attitude to the processes involved. This, he 
argues, has happened in psychometrics.  
 Psychologists simply assume they are able to measure virtually 
any mental abilities, traits, or attitudes without needing to establish 
that the attribute being measured is indeed quantitative. They as-
sume that the relations between the attributes and the test scores 
generated are quantitative, and the latter measure the hypothesised 
and presumed quantitative attributes concerned. But, as Michell 
argues, quantitative structure involves additivity. There are at least 
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some structures that are not quantitative (e.g., kinship structures), 
and so the assumption that psychological attributes indeed have 
quantitative structure is an untested empirical hypothesis: The “sci-
entific task of quantification” simply has not been done in psychol-
ogy, and developments in the means for assessing additivity—
conjoint measurement theory (Luce & Tukey, 1967)—have been ig-
nored by psychology. This might just be an error of omission, a 
breakdown in scientific process, and not a pathology, but for the 
fact that there is built into psychology is a higher-level dogma that 
prevents any serious examination of the matter.  
 Michell turns to the history of science and psychology to trace 
the genesis of this pathology. The Pythagorean thesis that nature is 
fundamentally quantitative was part of the scientific revolution, 
whose success obscured the fact that there is no necessity about 
this. Later, psychology’s bid to join the revolution was aided by the 
predictive value of psychometrics in various applications—even 
though this is really nothing more than actuarial relationships be-
tween test and criterion, no proof that tests are measures of any-
thing. The failure of psychologists to do the scientific task of quanti-
fication was further obscured, and the problem entrenched, when S. 
S. Stevens adopted an operationist, antirealist, principle that the 
rules for making the relevant numerical assignments define the 
variables, and that measurement is the assignment of numerals to 
objects or events according to rule (Michell, 1997). This stipulatively 
defines (rather than discovers) psychological attributes as quantita-
tive. Thus apparent gains—acceptance as a quantitative science, 
perhaps commercial payoffs in applied psychology—displaced the 
goals and procedures of genuine, scientific, critical inquiry, and has 
led us into scientific pathology.  
 The publication of Michell’s thesis in various places (for example, 
1990, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) has produced 
a great deal of heated debate. Not all of those involved understand 
the realism that underlies Michell’s argument. There are two as-
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pects of this realism that are important here. One is that Michell 
rejects the relativism built into Kuhn’s popular view of science. 
Kuhn’s view treats normal science not as a critical enterprise but as 
a mere social activity driven by a paradigm, largely a matter of ap-
plying a set of accepted procedures, models, theories and beliefs; 
nor does it treat science as a cognitive enterprise, but holds that 
truth and knowledge are only so within the paradigm. Kuhn there-
fore would not identify any such thing as a pathology of science, 
where the pathology depends on error. The second is, against the 
operationism mentioned above, that the quantitative or otherwise 
nature of variables is a matter of how the world is, not a matter of 
how persons operate on the world. More generally, the realist view is 
that the formal (logical and mathematical) sciences deal with the 
real structures of states of affairs in the world, and are not mere ex-
pressions of the forms of thought, discourse or convention—a view 
that has become fashionable in the past century. 
 Perhaps the major challenge to the orthodox psychological 
metatheory of empirical psychology in recent years has come from 
social constructionism and the sceptical account of knowledge that 
it and related philosophies embody—a challenge increasingly en-
countered as one moves away from cognitive experimental to social, 
personality and applied psychologies. This challenge is the target of 
Chapter 13, John Maze’s critique, Social Constructionism, Deconstruc-
tionism and Some Requirements of Discourse.   
 Social constructionism rejects the traditional ontologies of mind 
in which the mind is set over and against the world, either in their 
dualist version, where the psychological puzzle is how mental stuff 
relates to the external material world, or in their modern cognitive 
science version where the puzzle is how the mind/brain represents 
the external world. Instead, it is taken that social discourse is some-
how (ontologically?) primary and that mind, its supposed contents, 
and the world are constructed in that discourse. Their research fo-
cuses on how the various social/psychological subjects are shaped 
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and influenced by discourse, particularly the discourse of those in 
power. And it is taken that the subjects, which might be such differ-
ent things as justice, emotion, self, psychological disorder, or even 
mind itself, have their being by virtue of that discourse. It follows 
that knowledge (if one allows such a thing, and sometimes social 
constructionists do not) of the discursively constructed world can-
not be objective or true. It is relative to the context and interests of 
the language community, subject only to arbitrary, socially con-
structed rules. Realism and mainstream cognitive science are seen 
by constructionists as similar and both attacked as positivist, and 
more generally as “foundationalist”, part of a long tradition going 
back at least to Plato in which thinkers attempted to establish cer-
tain foundations for all knowledge.  
 Deconstructionism, a movement more important in literary and 
cultural studies than in psychology, shares a style of argument and 
certain general theses with social constructionism, and influences 
it. In both, language is given priority over, and somehow consti-
tutes, all those things that naively we might suppose pre-exist lan-
guage and to which we think we refer from within it. For decon-
structionists, the relation of meaning, of “signifiers” to that which is 
“signified” is not that of a word to a thing, reference, as we might 
ordinarily suppose it. But, because nothing has any independence of 
language or rather, as one might say, there is no ontology, every-
thing that we speak or think “refers” only to another equally arbi-
trary signifier. There is no world that gives final meaning to signifi-
cation and no objective knowledge. 
 Maze addresses himself to important theses in these two related 
positions, taking as representatives leading figures in each, Kenneth 
Gergen (e.g., 1985) on social construction and Jacques Derrida (e.g., 
1990) on deconstruction. His broad strategy is to show that their 
positions do not meet the standards of coherent, intelligible dis-
course—something that he takes to be a foundation of realism. As in 
other essays, Maze makes the point that discourse requires that we 
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must reject any idea of constitutive relations: A relation can only be 
sensibly spoken of as holding between10 two or more independent 
terms, and cannot constitute those terms. To repeat a theme that 
appears in a number of the essays of this collection, it is nonsense to 
say that the relation of mind to some thing (for example, knowing 
something) constitutes that thing; that there are things whose exis-
tence is constituted by a relation as, say, an image might be sup-
posed to exist by virtue of being the object of awareness. This is a 
charge used against a number of idealist accounts of mind and 
knowledge, because they are riddled with this sort of error.  
 Interestingly, Gergen picks up on aspects of this error, rejecting 
the representationist theory of knowledge, but in reaction falls into 
a general scepticism denying the possibility of knowledge, truth and 
objectivity. Dismissing as foundationalist any views that hold to 
these concepts, Gergen stresses the performative and political as-
pects of theoretical and scientific claims including, supposedly, of 
his own theory—as though this solves the problem of truth. Ger-
gen’s theoretical focus has, as Maze acknowledges, produced the 
valuable unearthing of social and political commitments disguised 
as science, but Maze points out that the claims social construction-
ists make about language, persons, people, emotions, real-world 
practices, knowledge, historical contingency, construction, power 
relations, are just that, claims that something is the case. To say some-
thing is constituted in social discourse makes no sense without 
there being some entities doing the constructing. In short, construc-
tionism depends on exactly the concepts the constructionist is os-
tensibly rejecting. In this constructionism is self-contradictory. 
 Maze suspects that social constructionists and deconstructionists 
are in part critical of the possibility of objective knowledge because 
                                                             
10   It may be noted that while social constructionists reject representation-
ism, various of their philosophical kin such as psychological constructivists 
(discussed by Mackay in Chapter 15) take a representationist view of 
knowledge. 
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they confuse this with a claim to indisputable knowledge, and they 
think that the possibility of error means the impossibility of truth. 
But the realist thesis on the possibility of objective knowledge is 
merely that something believed may be true and, of course, it may 
be false. It allows for the possibility of truth (and error) and has 
nothing to do either with indisputability or with a foundationalist 
quest for certainty. 
 Maze also argues that the deconstructionist thesis on the inde-
terminacy of all meaning and the impossibility of reference is as 
similarly general and corrosive a scepticism as that of construction-
ism, and is subject to the same critique. In practice, deconstruction-
ists, like the constructionists, must exempt their own utterances 
from their claim that no assertion is true or false and no matter is 
decidable, for otherwise in the very act of uttering it, they contra-
dict that claim—or must be held to be outside discourse and simply 
making sounds. Deconstructionists take the anti-objectivist thesis 
further. Derrida argues that logical principles such as laws of iden-
tity and contradiction are arbitrary, relics of an outmoded and con-
text-dependent logic, and that something can simultaneously be 
itself and not itself. Maze’s reply takes us back to the requirements 
of discourse: Derrida’s theory about the redundancy of logic is ei-
ther self-contradictory or quite literally unspeakable, dropping out 
of discourse into unintelligibility. 
 In sum, therefore, to make the kinds of critique that both con-
structionists and deconstructionists wish to (often justifiably), and 
to uncover in theory and practice the hand of powerful interests, 
social forces, and dissembling, requires the very concepts of truth, 
objectivity and logic that their philosophies deny. 
 It might seem odd to include here only the final paper of a series, 
Fiona Hibberd’s Reply to Gergen (Chapter 14), without including ei-
ther the original papers which Gergen attacked (Hibberd, 2001a, 
2001b) or Gergen’s reply (2001). However, Hibberd’s paper stands on 
its own. It confronts directly several common misconceptions about 
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realism that were expressed in Gergen’s paper, and in doing so 
states and clarifies some realist fundamentals. It also exposes a cer-
tain style of argument, a sleight of hand, by which constructionists, 
amongst others, disguise self-contradiction as merely embracing an 
alternative, nontraditional form of discourse. In her earlier papers 
in this series (2001a, 2001b), Hibberd argued that social construc-
tionism and positivism share some important similarities, a conven-
tionalism, a meaning-as-use thesis, and an antirealism—in spite of 
the fact that social constructionism sets itself up against positivism. 
Moreover, critics misidentify realism as positivism.  
 In her reply Hibberd shows that the realism for which she argues, 
being situational realism, does not ignore context, as charged by 
Gergen. A basic principle of realism is that whatever there is, is an 
occurrence or situation in space and time (see Chapters 1 and 3). 
That is to say, whatever exists is a situation located in context, and 
this affects that situation. Hibberd illustrates the importance of con-
text in the realist account of causation. In contrast to simple linear 
accounts of cause widely used in psychological research, realism 
takes causation to be a complex relation where an event acts upon 
field or context to produce an effect—a change in the field. Depend-
ing on the field (context), the same event or situation may bring 
about different effects, and different events or situations may bring 
about the identical effect, so the concept of a causal field is of cen-
tral importance in causal analysis. In psychology persons, being 
unique both as individuals (regardless of shared properties) and by 
entering into many relations, produce a unique causal field. This 
fact has important methodological implications, but is typically ig-
nored in the popular statistical procedures adopted within psychol-
ogy. 
 Next Hibberd tackles Gergen’s argument, a style of argument that 
is particularly slippery. It is carried out via a technique that, as 
Stove points out elsewhere (1981) “neutralises success words,” that 
is, takes terms that ordinarily indicate reference, truth, falsity, fac-
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tuality, contradiction, assertion and so on, and emasculates them by 
various means, putting them in scare quotes, perhaps, or rendering 
these all as moves in a “game” that might be played differently, 
claiming that they are irrelevant, or otherwise reframing them as 
not indicating reference, truth, falsity and so on. The construction-
ist trump card—if we may introduce a game reference of our own—
is of course that the critic cannot show this to be an invalid argu-
ment or that the conclusion is false because to do that is to enter a 
different game, a traditional game, indulging in a “rage for the real” 
(Gergen, 2001, p. 423) that the constructionist is not obliged to en-
ter11. However, Hibberd shows that in spite of his protestation, the 
social constructionist thesis of truth within traditions or games 
both denies the possibility of external reference, and depends upon 
it in the very act of its utterance. It is what in terms that the con-
structionist might otherwise favour a performative self-
contradiction. That is, when Hibberd and Gergen agree or disagree, 
say, on the influence of continental epistemology on social con-
structionism, they “agree on a certain state of affairs”. It is just this 
that realism says is a fact, a situation, and is not merely true under a 
particular set of conventions. Hibberd extends this argument to 
show that treating logical principles as conventions, mere rules, 
that could be changed at will, simply makes discourse impossible, 
including of course the discourse that Gergen is trying to sustain in 
attacking the views of his critics. 
 The relevance of the themes of Hibberd’s paper to psychological 
practice may be seen in Nigel Mackay’s On Some Accounts of Meaning 
and their Problems (Chapter 15). It deals with a compound position 
that includes both a prevalent account, or set of accounts, of mean-
ing and a related group of arguments used to defend that account 
against any possible criticism. This is a position that is taken not 
just by specialists in theoretical and philosophical psychology, but 
also by practising psychologists reflecting on their own practice, 
                                                             
11   The same argument is discussed by Mackay (Chapter 15) 
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who absorb and take comfort from the views of the former. The ap-
proach, which following some of its protagonists we will call mean-
ing-making, is opposed to the cognitivist mainstream and has gath-
ered strength to the degree that the theorists present themselves as 
offering a viable challenge to the psychological orthodoxy. It is a 
family of psychologies in domains such as psychotherapy, narrative 
psychology, constructivism, social constructionism, developmental 
constructivism, epistemology, social discourse analysis and beyond 
offered by those who wish to redirect the cognitive turn in psychol-
ogy. They identify their common focus as meaning-making, arguing 
for a change in attitude towards persons and the authority of scien-
tific psychology supposed by the establishment. They support this 
by appeal to an anti-objectivist, constructivist (or constructionist), 
postmodern philosophy. The bones of this partly moral argument, 
are that knowledge and reality are constructions by persons and not 
objective. Claims by psychological scientists and practitioners to 
know what leads to and ameliorates “disorder”, and so to know oth-
ers’ reality and what changes to effect in them, are therefore hubris. 
Further, such claims to truth are likely to be expressions of power 
relations disguised as objectivity. Meaning is implicated in that 
what persons construct (and there are different accounts of how 
this is done), their knowledge or reality, yields their meaning. And it is 
the meaning of the constructed world that explains why they do 
what they do, what they feel, think, or what distresses them.  
 Like Maze in his paper on social construction (Chapter 13), Mac-
kay is in the position of agreeing with many of the sentiments and 
some of the principles in the meaning-makers’ argument: He too 
holds that that psychology needs to be tolerant in theory and in 
practice, and that meaning is a vital yet neglected aspect of psy-
chology. Moreover, Mackay argues that meaning is indeed not in-
herent in objects—not a property of apprehended objects—and is 
constituted in the relation between persons and objects. But at this 
point he parts company with the constructivists and construction-
ists. He argues that tolerance is demanded not by the impossibility 
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of knowledge but by the state of psychology’s ignorance; that is, we 
require objective knowledge, about such things as the ignorance 
and limits of psychology and the facts about how damaging dogma 
is in psychotherapy and other applied psychologies, in order to up-
hold the principle of tolerance. Were there no objective knowledge, 
the constructivists and constructionists could not consistently ap-
peal as they do to facts, about the power relations embedded in psy-
chological practice, about the variability of meaning across cultures, 
etc. They could not even engage in meaningful discourse about any-
thing.  
 Mackay argues further that meaning needs further explication. 
The term is used indiscriminately in psychology to refer to at least 
two different psychological processes; one might be termed symbolic 
meaning and the other meaning as salience. The first is that where 
words, signs, acts, marks and tokens of various kinds have meaning 
in that they stand for or refer to something else, in language, con-
ventional or other myriad and varied representational systems. In 
propositions that make reference to situations, these tokens become 
part of truth claims. Meaning as motivational salience, is meaningful-
ness. It is where something has particular salience (is experientially 
meaningful) to a person, by virtue of its place in his or her system of 
interests. In this sense a harsh word from a lover may have particu-
lar meaning (be meaningful) to a person in a way that it would not 
from a stranger because of the importance of the lover in that per-
son’s system of interests. Meaning is a relation between a person 
(specifically motives) and objects. It is not constructed as part of a 
non-objective individual or social reality, though it does result from 
the interaction between persons and objects relevant to their moti-
vational interests. In line with a realist account of the independence 
of things from the relations between them, and the objective nature 
of relations, Mackay argues that the relation of motivational sali-
ence is an investigable part of the real, determinate world, though 
as a relation it does come into being in the interaction between per-
sons and objects.  
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 As with Maze (Chapter 13) and Hibberd (Chapter 14) part of the 
paper is also given over to a critique of the kinds of replies that con-
structionists generally give to criticism of their arguments, particu-
larly as exemplified in the response papers of McNamee and of 
Raskin and Neimeyer (McNamee, 2003; Raskin & Neimeyer, 2003) to 
the original version of the paper (Mackay, 2003). The construction-
ists' primary defensive move is to argue that constructionism is sim-
ply immune to objectivist assessment because they do not accept 
the objectivist premises. Specifically, among the defensive re-
sponses are that language is not about reference, but about making 
things happen; that constructivists make no assertions, but only 
offer an alternative discourse, in a world of many equally real con-
structed discourses, and in a spirit of openness and pluralist toler-
ance that derives from their epistemic pluralism; that truth (in as 
much as it is a useful notion) is contextual and is relative to dis-
course; that even debate, rationality and logic are contextual. To 
this Mackay replies, in similar vein to Maze (Chapter 13) and Hib-
berd (Chapter 14), that even the description of what constructivists 
do or do not do, their statements about how language functions and 
does not function, their references to what some realists said or did 
not say, require, if these are to make sense, acceptance of the very 
things that the protagonists deny: The constructionist is indeed 
making claims about states of affairs, wants others to believe that 
they are correct, and their discourse depends on logical principles 
that are not optional, such as maintaining a distinction between 
something being that thing and being not that thing.  
 The constructionist’s offensive move is to accuse realism of a 
range of errors: It is essentialist, absolutist, foundationalist, realists 
claim to know an absolute, transcendent reality or truth. Realism is 
also epistemically arrogant, claiming to know with certainty. Mac-
kay’s response is to point out that this is a “realism” of the construc-
tionist’s own making, a target that is a mixture of positivism and 
much that realism rejects. However easily these attacks can be 
shown to be simply misdirected, they indicate how deeply ingrained 
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are the common misunderstandings about realism: It is positivism; 
it is just the orthodox view of science and knowledge. These mis-
takes about what realists claim have been pointed out in detail 
(Maze, 2001) and even the commonalities of constructionist and re-
alist critiques of psychology explained in the literature with which 
constructionists are apparently engaged. The persistence of this 
mischaracterisation suggests that there runs through the construc-
tionist approach a hostility to the canons of argument and evidence 
and this limits their capacity to take reasoned opposition seriously 
and allows them to dismiss as “uninteresting” evidenced positions 
that oppose theirs. 
 In Chapter 16, Why Psychology has Neglected Symbolism and what a 
Realist Approach can Offer, Agnes Petocz continues with the theme of 
meaning discussed by Mackay, but her focus is on symbolism and 
symbolic activity, phenomena whose ubiquity makes it relevant to 
almost every area of psychology. Her analysis begins with an his-
torical and conceptual investigation of the reasons for the neglect of 
symbolism in mainstream psychology. She argues that this neglect 
has been the result of converging conclusions about the scientific 
intractability of symbolism, first from the vast extra-psychological 
literature, and second from the psychological mainstream, which 
has neglected meaning in its efforts to attain scientific respectabil-
ity. Petocz acknowledges that there are signs of change, and notes 
that, with the recent movements within mainstream psychology 
towards expansion and integration, the climate is now favourable 
for the return of meaning and symbolism. However, smooth inte-
gration is being hampered by the inability of psychology to find a 
suitable metatheoretical framework. Here, she addresses the point 
we identified in our introduction: Most contemporary mainstream 
psychologists would consider themselves to be realist and would not 
think the issue worthy of debate. Yet, as is argued in many of the 
essays, the mainstream position is neither consistently realist nor 
genuinely scientific. Instead, it remains just as trapped in aspects of 
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Cartesianism as are the supposedly antirealist Cartesian proponents 
of the new movements.  
 In the second part of her chapter, Petocz sets herself to answer 
the question what a thoroughgoing realist approach can offer to-
wards a general theory of symbolism. Rather than present a com-
plete account of the principles of realism, she selects just five key 
points helpful for a discussion of symbolism and meaning. Here, we 
meet again the idea of the conditions of discourse, the direct-realist 
view of cognition as a relation between knower and known, the point 
that the terms in a relation cannot be constituted in whole or part 
by that relation, the ontological egalitarianism of realism, according 
to which there are no “levels” of reality or “degrees” of truth, and 
the broader conception of scientific method as critical inquiry. To-
gether, these principles strike at the heart of mainstream psychol-
ogy’s position, exposing its misconceptions of realism, and having 
radical implications: that mind is not in the brain, that the contents 
of consciousness are not private, that relations such as cognition 
and meaning are as real as anything else that exists and are thus 
legitimate objects of scientific investigation, and that the attempt to 
investigate nonquantitative phenomena via quantitative methods is 
scientifically inappropriate. Some of these themes have appeared in 
earlier essays, in the context of other topics, but Petocz applies 
them to the task of showing what a realist approach can offer to-
wards a general, scientific theory of symbolism. 
 She adopts the modus operandi of all of the essays in this collection 
- which is to begin with conceptual analysis, following the realist 
view of science as critical inquiry and the principle that concep-
tual/logical testing must have priority over empirical testing. Locat-
ing symbolism within the broader domain of meaning, she offers an 
analysis that unites different types of symbolism. She argues that 
any theory of symbolism must respect certain logical constraints, 
the primary constraint being that symbolisation is a three-term re-
lation. Because one of the terms in the three-term relation must be 
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a cognising organism, another logical constraint is that a theory of 
symbolism must be a psychological theory. This guarantees the cen-
tral role of psychology in theories of symbolism. From that logical 
constraint there follow a number of psychological requirements 
which any psychological theory could reasonably be expected to 
meet (e.g., explaining how and why symbols occur, the bases for the 
symbol-symbolised connections, individual versus universal sym-
bolism, and so on). She then shows briefly how these constraints 
and requirements are either violated or neglected in the many dif-
ferent existing approaches to symbolism to be found in the non-
mainstream literature (e.g., in hermeneutics, semiotics, sociology, 
anthropology).  
 For an alternative, realist theory of symbolism, especially one 
which can extend its explanatory reach to difficult cases of symbol-
ism, Petocz draws upon psychoanalytic theory, particularly the 
writings of Freud. Clarifying Freud’s often confused theory, she of-
fers a realist, scientific version of psychoanalysis in general and 
symbolism in particular. This is based on the same aspects of Freud’s 
theory that other realists, including Anderson, have found to be 
valuable for a realist psychology: the Darwinian deterministic ap-
proach to motivation in terms of instinctual drives; the cognition-
motivation connection with the drives understood to be the subject 
terms of the knowing relation; the role of unconscious mental proc-
esses (desires and beliefs) in the production of human behaviour; 
and the vision of scientific investigation as extending legitimately to 
the combination of hermeneutic inquiry and causal explanation. 
 Petocz’s chapter is relatively long, dense in content, and tightly 
argued. This is because the essay is largely a condensed form of ma-
terial that was presented in more detail and elaboration in her ear-
lier book on Freud, psychoanalysis and symbolism (Petocz, 1999). 
The last sections on psychoanalysis and Freud’s theory are particu-
larly truncated, and the reader from mainstream psychology may 
feel that the theory of symbolism seems more hers than Freud’s (e.g., 
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she acknowledges that this is not the standard Freudian theory), 
that it requires more empirical substantiation, and that it is neither 
necessary nor appropriate to attribute so much to Freud. However, 
anyone who is familiar with the contents of Petocz’s book and/or 
with Freud’s published writings will appreciate her general stance 
that these ideas and themes are well entrenched and even devel-
oped in the Freudian corpus, albeit often so embedded in and com-
promised by other irrelevant or conceptually untenable material 
that a major task of textual extraction, exegesis, and synthesis is 
required. 
 Chapter 17, Philip Bell’s A New Psychology – The Metaphysical and the 
Mundane deals with the discipline of cultural studies, an area that, 
like symbolism, is not of mainstream concern for psychologists 
working in the empirical traditions of Anglophone psychology de-
partments, yet one where, as he demonstrates, theories require psy-
chological assumptions to attempt explanation of what is a very 
human product, culture. Bell takes the work of Brian Massumi 
(2002) and, more briefly, of Lisa Blackman (2008), as typifying recent 
writing in cultural studies, an area well outside the interest of most 
psychologists. The language, major names, theories, journals, and 
studies (rarely empirical in any sense that psychologists would rec-
ognise) would be alien to most psychologists. But it is included here 
for several important reasons. If we treat psychology as a social or 
human science, then cultural studies becomes a sister discipline or 
even rival way of trying to understand human action, albeit one 
very different from mainstream empirical psychology. Indeed, all 
the human and social sciences depend on a psychology, whatever 
name it may go by. That is, they incorporate an account of the de-
terminants of action and of the place of motives and values in this, a 
theory of mind, of knowledge and its objects. More generally, and as 
they must, they take positions on what constitutes truth (though 
they may be disinclined to use that term) in the human sciences. 
Indeed, as Bell argues, they take the mundane notions of psychology 
and give them a metaphysical interpretation. They may then be 
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subjected to the same analyses as the other topics of the papers 
here—and Bell explicitly sets out to apply to poststructuralist liter-
ary-philosophical theory the sort of criticisms that Hibberd (2001b) 
and Maze (2001 & Chapter 13) use against its less radical cousin, so-
cial constructionism. Moreover, while the intellectual style of cul-
tural studies is very different from mainstream psychology, and its 
idiom would be unrecognisable to most psychologists—a factor that 
keeps the two disciplines apart—yet the Weltanschauung that main-
tains and informs it, a postmodern, intensely theoretical, and anti-
empiricist philosophy, has in fact made inroads into psychology. 
Social constructionism and personal constructivism, hermeneutic 
readings of psychology and psychoanalysis, phenomenology, decon-
structionism, and psychologies of meaning-making (part of the ear-
lier mentioned heterogeneous group in psychological theory) 
ground their arguments in one or other variant of the same post-
modernism;12 and a surprising proportion of the articles in psychol-
ogy’s theoretical journals display the same sympathies.  
 Bell juggles two main tasks, one is to examine the opaque and 
slippery text of Massumi, interpreter of the major “Theorist”, Gilles 
Deleuze (1996), and of Blackman in her undergraduate text (2008). 
Massumi’s writing is dizzyingly abstract, and semantically elastic to 
the point of incoherence. Yet Bell extracts a number of identifiable 
theses from Massumi’s work (2002). These are various positions on 
philosophical, particularly ontological, and psychological matters: 
on the nature of the subject, on what is to count as real, on lan-
guage, on determinism, on memory, thought, affect and desire. 
They are, however, not necessarily what Massumi claims them to 
be. The other of Bell’s tasks is to show that, in spite of the typical 
poststructuralist claims to transcend dualisms, overcome the static 
conceptualisations of phenomena, traditional causality and the 
                                                             
12   This may be controversial in that postmodernists are inclined at times 
to distance themselves from (say) phenomenologists or older style herme-
neuticists. “Poststructuralism” is a favoured term for the approach of these 
writers in “literary-philosophical” theory. 
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categories of empirical science, or to avoid idealism, essentialism, 
foundationalism, and hypostatisation, authors such as Massumi and 
Blackman commit standard antirealist errors.  
 Bell points out that large parts of Massumi’s work are simply in-
coherent. His reasoning is often circular, and even in apparently 
endorsing a position he will undermine it. Massumi, for example, in 
saying that perception is not subjective—with which a realist must 
agree—says that the thing perceived is its being perceived. In this 
he violates the conditions of ordinary discourse, treats things as 
constituted by their relations, and ends up in a subjective idealism. 
Massumi also follows other poststructuralists in attempting an on-
tology without objects or beings. Instead, he focuses on "becom-
ings", as if these might exist without the entities that change, or 
more generally on relations as if these might exist without the 
terms that subtend them. Thus relations become reified, and even 
treated as agents in a dynamic world. Bell also points out the vital-
ism that this is associated with: Becoming requires life to be in-
vested with the power to become.  
 Bell shows that, though written in a language alien to empirical 
psychologists, cultural studies requires a psychology, and many of 
the same problems that the other essays in this collection claim ex-
ist in orthodox psychology persist in cultural studies. Bell’s final 
comments indicate something that, in our view, may be the most 
troubling of all. The writing that Massumi exemplifies—though Bell 
treats it seriously and avoids the temptation to parody—is shown by 
Bell to be intellectually dishonest and divorced from critical inquiry. 
Like some of the other postmodern views discussed in these papers 
(Maze, Chapter 13, Mackay, Chapter, 15), it has built into it an im-
munity from criticism. This is the view that critics, should they 
point out contradictions or problems, do so because they are en-
snared in the illusions of positivism and an antiquated idea of truth 
and the hubris of realist certainty. Critics fail to understand that 
texts make no claim to truth, but are written merely to illuminate 
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meanings, and to augment experience. Therefore, the immunity 
thesis goes, criticism may be ignored. 
 In the next chapter (18), Joel Michell takes up the matter of The 
Place of Qualitative Research in Psychology. In recent years there has 
been something of a revival of qualitative methods in psychology, 
crossing over from disciplines like education, social and cultural 
studies, and clinical disciplines. As Michell points out, this is often 
justified philosophically, by associating traditional “realist” re-
search solely with quantitative methods and claiming that an alter-
native, that is a nonrealist, paradigm is required to accommodate 
qualitative research. Michell then turns “the qualitative question” 
on its head; in effect, he asks not “can psychology legitimately use 
qualitative methods?” but “are we in psychology using quantitative 
methods legitimately?”  
 Michell’s answer, as in his earlier chapter (12) is that we do not 
know—yet. But there is in science and philosophy of science a pow-
erful quantitative imperative—an outgrowth of the Pythagorean-
Platonic view that reality is fundamentally quantitative. And this, 
together with a desire to repeat the successes of the quantitative 
natural sciences, has led mainstream psychology to assume that psy-
chological variables are quantitative, without first doing the scien-
tific job of testing the hypothesis that they are. Consequently, tradi-
tional psychologists take it that the scientific method is and must be 
quantitative, and identify it with measurement and experimenta-
tion.  
 Thus it emerges that often advocates both of qualitative research 
and of quantitative research methods, though they hold to different 
views of truth, knowledge and method, in fact agree to what in a 
related context Sherwood (1969) called the thesis of the separate 
domain. This is that there are separate domains of knowledge 
achieved by different means. It is common for the apologists for 
qualitative research, for example Guba and Lincoln (1994), to argue 
that there are different discourses, different paradigms of research, 
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with different underlying philosophies, qualitative research needing 
to reject that of the positivist, scientific mainstream and its quanti-
tative experimental traditions, and adopt a postpositivist philoso-
phy. And of course, from the other side, the traditional empirical 
mainstream are deeply suspicious of qualitative research and its 
philosophy. One only needs to spend a short while in the company 
of either group to grasp this mutual suspicion. 
 Once again, realists find themselves, if not calling for a plague to 
descend on both houses, at least wanting to make clear that the con-
traposition of these domains is misguided: Science is not positivism; 
quantification is neither necessary nor sufficient to define science; 
to reject the quantitative imperative is not to abandon objectivity; 
to allow that qualitative research leads to knowledge is neither to 
abandon science nor to embrace the postmodern relativisation of 
truth in which each discourse is a linguistic framework with its own 
logic and its own internal, paradigm-dependent standards of truth. 
The realist conception of science is, Michell insists, that of critical 
inquiry. This is the fundamental method of science. Discourse has 
the form it has because it makes contact with reality. Things can be 
as claimed, and truth is possible. Indeed, to assert otherwise is to 
deny our assertion in the very act of saying it. Particular methods, 
quantitative or qualitative, are supplementary and do not define 
science. And what makes a method scientific is that it uses a combi-
nation of careful and systematic observation and the best available 
error-detection mechanisms to bring the investigator into better 
contact with phenomena which might otherwise remain hidden. It 
does so by the means that we mentioned in connection with 
Michell’s chapter on the pathology of psychometrics (Chapter 12): 
by being a method of systematic doubt and error-correction in the 
face our epistemic fallibility. 
 Michell also discusses the realist account of situations and the 
idea of quantity. Any situation is propositionally structured; some-
thing is predicated of some subject term. Number and quantity are 
100 NIGEL MACKAY & AGNES PETOCZ
 
features of all situations just because subjects are countable things 
located in time and space—hence the source of the temptation to 
Pythagoreanism. Yet the attributes of the predicate term may or 
may not be quantitative. It is a matter of discovery. For example, the 
main phenomena investigated by physics turned out to be quantita-
tive. But much of the data of psychology appear not to be quantita-
tive in that sense, but qualitative. They may perhaps be ordered 
(e.g., that taste is sweeter than this) but not properly quantitative 
(that wave is 2.4 times higher than this). Further, in spite of the fact 
that psychologists make repeated observations on these qualitative 
phenomena (e.g., intellectual ability) and generate frequencies from 
their aggregated data, this does not amount to an observation of 
their quantitative structure. They are only taken to be so because 
psychologists import the assumption that the underlying structures 
must be quantitative. There are some psychologically important 
phenomena, for example meaning (see the discussion in Petocz, 
Chapter 16) whose nature means that even these psychometric 
transformations cannot be applied. Rather than considering that a 
qualitative approach may be required, traditional, quantitatively-
obsessed psychology, neglects them, thus relinquishing the oppor-
tunity to develop accounts of the possible qualitative structures of 
psychological phenomena. 
 The theme of the scientific legitimacy of qualitative methods is 
picked up in the next chapter (19) in Agnes Petocz’s Science, Meaning 
and the Scientist-Practitioner Model of Treatment. At first glance it 
would seem to be a long way from the abstract world of psychologi-
cal theory. But its force is to demonstrate just how closely theory 
and practice are intertwined, and just what are the costs to psycho-
logical practice when that practice is based on inadequate or flawed 
theory.  
 Petocz addresses a response by Robert Sternberg, the President of 
the American Psychological Association, to a media article which 
described scientists and practising psychologists as engaged in con-
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tinuous warfare across a “scientist-therapist” gap. Sternberg rejects 
this, insisting that there is no such warfare, and setting out the 
various aspects of the scientist-practitioner model which underpins 
the academic training of psychological practitioners. Training via 
this model is designed to ensure that science informs practice and 
practice informs science in a continuing process of mutual support 
and refinement. Petocz’s objection is not to the model; she agrees 
that it is justified as the standard for all forms of psychological in-
tervention. But, she argues, the implementation of the model is only 
as good as the conception of science on which it is based, and that is 
seriously defective. 
 The paper centres on one of the major themes of the present col-
lection of essays - the nature of science as critical inquiry, and the 
extent to which that is neglected or violated within the supposedly 
scientific psychological mainstream. The core of Petocz’s argument 
is that it is not science, but a package of distortions driven by scien-
tism, that prevails in psychology and that involves deep misconcep-
tions about two things: the meaning of science and the science of 
meaning. Prominent among these distortions is psychology’s atti-
tude towards measurement and psychometrics, as discussed exten-
sively by Michell (including in chapters 12 and 18 of the present col-
lection). But there are many other distortions, ranging from various 
methodological and data analytic practices to ideas about what con-
tent is appropriate for scientific psychological investigation. One 
major content area that has been excluded is that of meaning. This 
has reinforced the idea of a science-meaning gap, and has fuelled 
the hijacking of meaning by non-mainstream movements ideologi-
cally committed to antirealism. Consequently, it has left the com-
munity of academically trained psychologists with the unfortunate 
view that clinical and other areas of practice must depart from sci-
ence to the extent that the practitioner wishes to deal with mean-
ings.  
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 However, as Petocz argues, this view has no scientific warrant. 
She sets out the realist aspects of science, including its necessary 
methodological attunement to the nature of the subject matter of 
inquiry, and its rejection of a simplistically linear approach to cau-
sality. She then draws out the implications for psychotherapeutic 
outcome or efficacy research, particularly with respect to the ques-
tion of what counts as evidence, showing that these implications 
strike at the heart of the “evidence-based” practices sanctioned 
within the mainstream by appeal to the scientist-practitioner 
model. She then addresses the meaning of meaning and its place in 
scientific psychology. Her treatment of meaning overlaps with her 
treatment of symbolism (in Chapter 16), highlighting the nature of 
meaning as a three-term relation and the logical constraints and 
psychological requirements that must be met by any adequate sci-
entific theory of meaning. She notes that the way ahead looks prom-
ising, for there are increasingly sophisticated qualitative tools and 
techniques suitable for the scientific investigation of meaning. 
 Petocz closes the paper by discussing the implications of her ar-
guments for the scientist-practitioner model of treatment, and the 
changes in the implementation of this model that would be required 
for psychology to do justice to it. She thus offers some suggestions 
for progress in scientific psychological practice, and identifies three 
main positive consequences. The first, following from a more so-
phisticated conception of causality, would be a better understand-
ing of the relationship between theory and practice, leading, in 
turn, to a more healthy appreciation of the minefield that is psycho-
therapeutic outcome research. The second, following from the re-
habilitation of meaning within mainstream psychology, would be 
the beginnings of a breaking down of some of the pseudoboundaries 
between behavioural, cognitive-behavioural, psychodynamic and 
other theories and treatment models, albeit in a way that respects 
the limits of any such eclecticism. The third, following from appre-
ciation of science as critical inquiry, would be an overhauling of un-
derstanding and teaching in the entire field of research methods, 
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thus dispelling the misguided tensions between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, and producing a new generation of practi-
tioners better equipped to attune their treatment to the nature of 
the particular person/problem/environment constellation that they 
are faced with. 
 In addressing itself to practical issues at the heart of psychology, 
Petocz’s paper shows in a number of ways the relevance to psychol-
ogy of the principles of realism discussed in these essays. It answers 
directly Stam’s challenge, mentioned in our introduction, for real-
ism to show how it can offer “a psychology of practical signifi-
cance”. Importantly, while many practising psychologists have 
called for greater flexibility and multidisciplinarity on political, 
economic, or social grounds, a realist approach shows that such 
flexibility is warranted on purely scientific grounds. The realist mes-
sage is that proper adherence to the scientist-practitioner model 
requires that we make sure that we get our science right.   
 The next chapter (20) picks up on a theme touched on in Petocz’s 
paper, and discussed in some of the earlier essays (especially Chap-
ters 5, 6, and 16), that of realism’s combination with aspects of psy-
choanalytic theory. Simon Boag’s Addressing Mental Plurality: Justifica-
tion, Objections and Logical Requirements of Strongly Partitive Accounts of 
Mind deals specifically with the convergence of the realist relational 
view of mind and the psychoanalytic pluralistic theory of motiva-
tion. If knowing is a relation between a subject (the knower) and an 
object (the situation known), then it is of interest to ask whether 
there is within each person just a single, unified knower or “self”, or 
whether there is a plurality of knowers, and, further, what exactly is 
the nature of this knower or knowers. Boag argues that there are 
convincing reasons for adopting a strongly partitive view of mind. 
Abnormal phenomena such as dissociative identity disorder and 
split-brain states, together with normal cases of self-deception, 
mental conflict in desires, and repression, all seem to suggest that 
the mind is not a unity but, as Anderson, following Freud, described 
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it, a “society or economy of impulses” (1934, p. 74) that is, a “set of 
drives or urges and not ... an abstract cognisor” (1953, p. 360) Boag 
traces to Plato’s Republic the view that psychological conflict entails 
a multiplicity of knowers or desirers, and he explicitly follows Maze 
(1983) and Petocz (1999) in adopting the view that the competing 
knowers are the motivational systems, the instinctual drives, as 
conceived by Freud.  
 Despite its obvious relevance to psychology, the topic of mental 
unity versus division is widely discussed in the philosophical litera-
ture, but rarely within psychology. Boag considers the various phi-
losophical objections and competing approaches, according to 
which mental conflict and the phenomena of irrationality do not 
necessitate mental partitioning. However, these alternatives do not 
survive Boag’s critical scrutiny. For example, Heil’s (1989) account 
treats mere beliefs as somehow implying direction of action, when, 
as Boag points out, beliefs are policy-neutral and need to be com-
bined with motivational states to produce action. This point is rele-
vant to mainstream psychology’s widespread preference for cogni-
tive theories of motivation (a theme examined by Newbery in the 
last chapter of this collection). Boag also considers the claim that, 
phenomenologically, we only ever have a single frame of reference, 
and replies that the illusion of unity may well be the result of multi-
ple knowers all operating via the single body and the single set of 
perceptual apparatus. Next Boag addresses Gardner’s (1993) thesis 
that plurality in terms of motivational sources within a single per-
son does not entail a purality of parts which function like agents, 
but reduces to a Humean bundle of conflicting desires. Boag’s re-
sponse is to point out that motivations must operate through the 
organism’s perceptual apparatus, that any (even a single) “agent” 
must have its own source of motivation, and that a “desire”, being a 
relation, requires a desirer. Desirers must have their own properties, 
and be specified independently, otherwise we risk falling into the 
conceptually flawed practice of defining them only in terms of their 
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objects, and postulating them in an ad hoc way to account for any 
possible behaviour.  
 Drawing together these points, Boag identifies three logical re-
quirements for a coherent and acceptable strongly partitive theory: 
that a knower must possess its own intrinsic properties and cannot 
be defined in terms of its relations; that an account must be pro-
vided of how the knower is related to cognition and motivation; and 
that a plausible account of the causal origins of the knowers must 
also be provided. Against these criteria, Boag contrasts Pears’s 
(1984, 1986) strongly partitive theory with that of Maze (1983, 1987), 
and finds that only Maze’s account meets the criteria. Here, the 
candidates for the subject terms are the Freudian instinctual drives, 
which can be defined deterministically, in terms of their physiologi-
cal sources, are psychobiological in the sense of being connected to 
the organism’s perceptual apparatus, and have causal origins expli-
cable via evolution. 
 The relevance of the issues discussed in Boag’s paper lies in the 
fact that they challenge some widespread misconceptions in main-
stream psychology: that we are comprised of a single, unified 
knower or “self”; that beliefs are sufficient to explain the direction 
of action; that conflict is resolved via decisions made by a non-
motivated, rational agent; and that drive theory is inadequate as a 
basis for the explanation of human behaviour. 
 The perceived inadequacy of the concept of drives is taken up in 
the next chapter (21) by Doris McIlwain, in Rezoning Pleasure: Drives 
and Affects in Personality Theory. McIlwain’s point of departure is the 
observation that, in personality theory (as in psychology generally), 
affects and emotions are becoming increasingly more accepted and 
considered “research respectable”, whereas drives are being de-
leted, not only from mainstream psychology but also from psycho-
analytic theory. McIlwain explores how and why this has happened, 
and why it is important for psychology to include drive theory as 
part of its motivational package. She then proposes, via Westen 
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(1997) a “lean mean motivational model” of personality develop-
ment which combines a view of drives based on the early Freud with 
a differential affect theory indebted to Silvan Tomkins. She argues 
that mere rejection of Cartesian dualism in favour of embodiment is 
not enough; one must take embodiment seriously, and spell out ex-
actly how it is relevant. Once that is done, it becomes clear that 
drives are indispensable. Re-including drives moves us towards a 
more fully embodied, determinist, scientific theory of mind and mo-
tivation. She then applies her model to a number of case studies in 
personality theory (narcissism, psychopathy, personality disorders, 
etc.), showing how these cases can be accounted for via the “cascad-
ing constraints” of genetic-environment interactions combined 
with different developmental paths based on co-assemblies of drive-
affect and affect-affect relations.  
 The value to realist psychology of drawing upon psychoanalytic 
theory is a theme found in Anderson’s writings (1934, 1940, 1953), 
and reinforced by other authors in the present collection. McIlwain 
shares Anderson’s views on the central role of affect, although she 
does not follow him in nominating the affects or feelings as the sub-
ject terms of the cognitive relation (1934; see also McMullen, 1996) 
preferring instead to adopt the view (taken also by Maze, Petocz, 
Boag and some other authors in this collection) that the drives are 
the knowers. But, like Tomkins, McIlwain accords equal motiva-
tional status to affects in personality theory. Of particular relevance 
to the present book is the way in which McIlwain shows that, in the 
rejection of drive theory, the confusions and errors in mainstream 
psychology are exactly the same as those to be found in many post-
Freudian developments in psychoanalysis.  
 For example, in attachment theory, which is something of a “fla-
vour of the month” in contemporary psychological theory and re-
search, much explanatory weight is given to internal schemas and 
working models, and lip service is paid to the importance of evolu-
tionary mechanisms promoting attachment behaviours. Yet the 
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“messy pleasures of the body” and the roles of drive and affect 
within those schemas or working models are left out of the picture. 
Similarly, many contemporary accounts of affect, emotion and mo-
tivation are simply cognition in superficial disguise; the Cartesian 
rational mind retains its long privileged place in the explanatory 
landscape.  
 With respect to the erosion of drives from psychoanalytic theory, 
the move away from a classical Freudian paradigm to object rela-
tions, self psychology and intersubjectivism is based on the same 
errors, and motivated by the same ideological commitments, that 
are found in mainstream psychology. First, there is the pseudodi-
chotomy of drives versus relationships. Drives are seen as blind, bio-
logical, noncognitive urges, seeking only the non-social pleasures of 
the body, unable to be modified, and forever disconnected from 
“higher” social and cultural activities. Conversely, intimacy and re-
latedness are seen as independent of drives and not underpinned by 
bodily needs. However, as McIlwain points out, Freud saw drives as 
malleable in terms of what elicits them and in their manner of ex-
pression, and as necessarily related to objects/people, thus preclud-
ing a simplistic biological reductionism. Second is the firmly en-
trenched view that cognitions, beliefs or self-structures can be mo-
tivational in themselves, and so can adequately replace drives as mo-
tivational sources. But, as McIlwain argues, “we cannot live by 
meaning, transference and intersubjectivity alone”; cognitive and 
self structures, scripts, schemas, narratives, scenes, etc. are all un-
derpinned and shaped by drive-related interests and needs, and 
cannot stand as alternatives. Connecting these two errors is the de-
sire to rescue motivational theory from the bonds of determinism 
and naturalism, which are perceived to diminish our humanity. 
 In general, then, the themes explored in McIlwain’s paper speak 
directly to the unrecognised sources of difficulty in much of con-
temporary mainstream psychology. Primary is the almost universal 
lack of an adequate theory of motivation, and failure to understand 
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what would be required within a deterministic, scientific psychol-
ogy. Mainstream psychologists would insist that they support real-
ism, naturalism and determinism; yet they do not carry this through 
in their treatment of motivation. In continuing to elevate cognition 
above motivation, to the extent of offering theories of motivation 
that are little more than cognition-plus-free-agency in disguise, 
mainstream psychology’s crypto-Cartesianism and convergence 
with humanistic theory is evident. Ironically, as McIlwain shows, 
developments in psychoanalysis have followed the same course, and 
for the same humanistic moral reasons - to replace a determinism of 
drives with an autonomous, teleological “self” or “self-structure” 
disconnected from mere bodily needs and pleasures. Consistent 
with a thoroughgoing realist perspective, McIlwain shows the “ex-
planatory muscle” of an “honest metapsychology” which includes a 
deterministic theory of motivation, based on argument and evi-
dence, rather than on fashion and ideology. 
 The realist, determinist approach to motivation includes causal 
roles for both desires and beliefs/cognitions. In the next chapter 
(22), A realist Account of Mental Causation, Sharon Medlow takes up 
the question of how the realist externalist theory of cognition can 
account for the causal efficacy of cognition. Specifically, if cognition 
is not an internal brain state, but, instead, a relation between brain 
state and situation in the environment, how exactly can that rela-
tion as a whole play any causal role? How can relations be causes?  
 Medlow’s paper fills a gap in the realist literature, because, as she 
correctly notes, a clear account of mental causation has not yet ap-
peared. She addresses specifically Maze’s (1983) attempt, in which 
he appeals to the brain’s “relational properties” to account for men-
tal causation. This appeal betrays an assumption, almost universally 
shared, that it is an object’s possession of intrinsic states, properties 
and processes, and not its standing in relation to other things, that 
makes it causally efficacious. Therefore, even if cognition is a rela-
tion, it is the internal properties and processes of just one term of 
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that relation, the brain, which are the causally efficacious aspects of 
cognition. 
 But this would mean that, strictly speaking, the fact of the brain’s 
standing in relation to environmental situations would then be re-
dundant in the causal story. In mainstream psychology, this prob-
lem is mistakenly thought to be avoided by an internalist view of 
cognition. But internalism cannot escape the need to connect the 
internal brain state with the external world (i.e., the objects of cog-
nition), and, as discussed in several of the earlier essays, all attempts 
to accommodate this result in accounts that are conceptually flawed 
and so cannot possibly be correct. Externalism must be the way to 
go. But, as Maze’s appeal to “relational properties” shows, there is a 
strong temptation to smuggle internalism back in when it comes to 
explaining mental causation. Medlow argues that, apart from the 
fact that the concept of relational properties is unsound, Maze’s ap-
peal to them leaves his account open to the charge of epiphenome-
nalism, which he is explicitly at pains to avoid.  
 In evaluating critically the concept of relational properties, Med-
low draws upon one of the major principles of realism, the distinc-
tion between relations and their terms. She argues that an object’s 
relations cannot be its properties, for properties do not imply the 
existence of anything beyond themselves, whereas relations do. So, 
the error in claiming that an object has relational properties is a 
matter of confusing situations that extend beyond that object, and 
necessarily involve other objects, with internal states that belong 
exclusively to that object itself. Hence, Medlow emphasises the real-
ist point that, cognition being a relation, the brain is necessary but 
not sufficient; the brain’s properties and processes are “founda-
tional” to its cognitive relations, in the sense that it could not enter 
cognitive relations without having those properties, but the rela-
tions are external to the brain’s intrinsic properties. In mental causa-
tion, therefore, as opposed to physiological causation, it is cognitive 
relational situations that must be causal. 
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 Medlow then proceeds to develop an alternative realist account 
of mental causation. She does this via three steps. In the first, she 
addresses the “locality assumption”, which underlies the belief that 
externalism and behaviour-causation are incompatible. This is the 
assumption that what happens at the causal nexus is local, proxi-
mate and intrinsic. She argues that, even if we accept that causes 
must be spatially and temporally contiguous with their effects, we 
need to recognise that properties and events are themselves ex-
tended in space and time, and that, in causal situations, only parts of 
those situations actually ever come into direct physical contact. She 
uses the example of a window’s being broken (effect) by a brick’s 
having been thrown through it (cause). Strictly speaking, only one 
surface of the brick comes into contact with one part of the window, 
yet we do not conclude that only the properties located on that sur-
face of the brick were responsible for breaking the window; instead, 
the cause is a complex situation which includes the brick’s relevant 
properties, its rate of movement, etc.  
 Mainstream psychology has long followed the behavourists’ insis-
tence that if psychology is to become a respectable science it must 
restrict its causal explanations to observable behaviour. In the sec-
ond step in her argument, Medlow revisits the definition of behav-
iour, exposing psychology’s failure to provide a clear and coherent 
account of this central variable. She demonstrates that even the be-
haviourists failed to acknowledge that behaviour involves not just 
bodily movements, and not just outcomes of those movements, but 
the guiding of the movements by the organism’s beliefs about con-
sequences of movements. Only in that way can we distinguish be-
haviour from accidental consequences of movements. Hence, be-
haviour is itself a causal process in which cognitions play a causal 
role, and which is extended spatio-temporally such that it begins 
and ends in environmental events, at some stage involving proc-
esses internal to the organism. 
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 In the third step in her argument, Medlow returns to the main 
question - the role played by cognitive relational situations in the 
causation of behaviour. Her account draws upon the realist thesis 
that causality involves a network or field, rather than a simple lin-
ear sequence; it involves a three-term relation (A’s leading to B 
within situation C), rather than a two-term relation (A’s leading to 
B). She then expands another theme discussed in earlier essays, the 
relation between cognition and motivation. Part of the causal field 
is the organism’s motivational state, understood in terms of the op-
eration of instinctual drives which motivate the organism to move. 
When combined with the organism’s knowledge about situations in 
the environment and the likely consequences of certain move-
ments, these lead to behaviour (movements guided by cognition 
about movement-outcomes). Medlow emphasises that this is a de-
terministic, nonteleological account; an organism does not choose to 
act in accordance with its beliefs in order to satisfy its drives; in-
stead, an organism’s knowledge of environmental situations, when 
combined with the organism being in a particular drive state, causes 
the organism to behave. 
 Medlow addresses the objection, often raised, that this account 
provides insufficient detail (e.g., of brain states, neurophysiological 
processes, etc.); that is, it does not address the neural mechanisms 
of mental causation. Her response is to reiterate the realist point 
that such processes pertain only to the subject term of the cognitive 
relation, and cannot provide information about mental causation 
itself, because cognitive relational situations cannot be reduced to 
their smaller components. Indeed, this point holds for any causal 
sequence; once we have identified the kinds of initiating event that 
reliably bring about certain kinds of effect within certain kinds of 
causal field, we have explained the causal process in question. And, 
since cognition is a spatio-temporally extended relation that obtains 
between organisms and environmental situations, realism locates 
human mentality in the natural world, and sees no ontological dif-
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ference between mental causation and other types of causal events, 
which also involve relational situations.  
 Medlow’s paper thus brings a realist account of mental causation 
into connection with other realist themes: mind as relation; the dis-
tinction between relations and the objects related; the characterisa-
tion of the subject term of the cognitive relation as a set of instinc-
tual drives; causality as a network or field; and the locating of hu-
man mentality and its causal role within the natural world. 
 In the final essay of this collection (Chapter 23), Drive Theory Re-
considered (Again!), Glenn Newbery continues with the themes of the 
previous two chapters: objections to drive theory and the question 
of mental causation. In some of the earlier papers, the importance 
of motivation in a realist psychology was emphasised, and Maze in 
particular argues (Chapter 6) that a properly conceptualised drive 
theory—of the sort that Freud set out, albeit tightened up conceptu-
ally—can satisfy scientific, realist requirements and say something 
about the primary term of a cognitive relation. However, as McIl-
wain discussed in Chapter 21, not only has psychoanalytic theory 
come to be widely rejected in academic psychology (see also Petocz 
in Chapter 16), but the kind of motivation theory that Freud offered, 
a nonteleological drive theory, has been rejected even within psy-
choanalytic circles. Within mainstream scientific psychology, there 
is something paradoxical about the rejection of psychoanalysis on 
the grounds that it is not scientific, and the replacement of deter-
ministic drive theory with cognitive motivation theory, which of-
fers teleological explanations involving independent psychological 
needs and an agent-like self which co-ordinates actions and chooses 
to behave. This popular and influential cognitive approach to moti-
vation has dominated mainstream psychology for over half a cen-
tury. Newbery examines it critically, via considering its two major 
objections to drive theory. 
 The first is the philosophical objection that drive theory, being 
mechanistic, cannot accommodate the causal role of higher mental 
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processes, that is, it cannot explain behaviour produced by such 
things as reason, forethought, intention and choice. Newbery’s 
strategy is to show that, on the contrary, it is cognitive motivation 
theory that cannot offer a coherent account of mental causation, 
because it is implicitly committed to the antiscientific theses of du-
alism and free-will. Newbery shows that proponents of the cognitive 
approach want cognitions (and, significantly, only conscious ones) to 
play a role in the determination of behaviour, but they do not want 
to locate these within a properly deterministic system. He exposes 
the explanatory emptiness of the teleology and mysterious causal 
powers of the self-as-agent that cognitivist accounts posit, as well as 
the dualism that underlies them. Thus the theses that a properly 
determinist theory of drive does exclude, such things as the disem-
bodied, rational, uncaused self, are deservedly rejected because they 
are incoherent and unscientific. However, drive theory can accom-
modate mental causation. Here Newbery deals with some of the dif-
ficulties in setting out a clear account of mental causation in a real-
ist, determinist, and scientific account of behaviour. He concedes 
that Freud’s later formulation of the ego as a set of control functions 
suffers from the same problems which are to be found in cognitive 
motivation theories. But Freud’s earlier concept of the ego as a sub-
set of the drives (the ego or self-preservative instincts) is sound; 
hence, the knowers, the subject terms of the cognitive relation, are 
the instinctual drives. Contrary to the mistaken view of the cogni-
tive critics, drives do not bypass thought processes on their way to 
triggering action. Drive-structures are cognisors; they operate ac-
cording to the “reality principle” (via reason, cognition, perception, 
exploration of the environment, etc.) in the service of the “pleasure 
principle” (satisfaction or gratification via consummatory activities 
and their experientially determined elaborations). As to the ques-
tion how cognitions can be causally efficacious, Newbery follows 
Medlow in being critical of Maze’s appeal to the “relational proper-
ties” of the organism. Instead, given that all causes are situations 
extended in space and time, cognitive relational situations are per-
fectly respectable candidates to be causes. 
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 Newbery then considers the second objection to drive theory, 
which is based on experimental observations that organisms will 
engage in, or seek, activity even though each of their primary drives 
is (supposedly) satisfied. Here, Newbery argues that, since the per-
ceptual-cognitive apparatus operates in the service of the primary 
drives, it is important to distinguish between a drive’s being satisfied 
and a drive’s being inoperative; drive satisfaction (as, e.g., in the case 
of a hungry person who has finished a meal) does not preclude con-
tinuing drive operation (perceiving and acting on relevant informa-
tion, as when the hunger-satiated person is caused to stockpile food 
supplies on hearing that there will be a shortage). Hence, the critics’ 
view that a person in a drive-satisfied state would simply cease to 
engage in any behaviour at all rests on a misunderstanding of drive 
theory.   
 Newbery completes his paper with a discussion of the difficulty of 
establishing empirically the nature and number of primary drives, 
even if they are defined deterministically in terms of their physio-
logical sources. He argues that an alternative path - a path sug-
gested by Freud himself - is to consider the question from the point 
of view of biology and evolution, according to which the environ-
ment has shaped the organism’s motivational structures. Thus, the 
set of phylogenetically primary drives can reliably be identified in 
terms of those behaviours which are necessary either for the sur-
vival of the individual, or for the survival of the species to which the 
individual belongs. These drives have evolved in the service of the 
organism’s basic needs. However, not all basic needs have led to the 
evolution of complex drive structures, because that depends on the 
environmental contingencies concerning the availability of basic 
supplies. This approach would also explain a number of evolved ac-
tion patterns (e.g., the various forms of attachment behaviour) 
which are innate but phylogenetically secondary (in the sense of hav-
ing evolved in the service of the primary drives).  
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 Newbery concludes that, when revisited along these lines, drive 
theory is adequate to account for the observed complexities of be-
haviour, by providing a logically sound and empirically plausible 
case for motivation-cognition connection and derivation. Specifi-
cally, drive theory “provides an account of (i) how the primary bio-
logical drives are perceptually and cognitively based structures, 
which have evolved in the service of basic and indisputable biologi-
cal needs, and (ii) how the purportedly independent psychological 
needs, whose primitive forms are evident even at birth (i.e., they are 
innate), would be expected to have evolved in the service of the pri-
mary biological drives, and so not be disconnected from them.” 
 It is fitting to end the collection with Newbery’s paper. First, it 
reinforces the case which has been presented throughout the essays 
that mainstream, realist, scientific psychology is neither consis-
tently realist nor genuinely scientific. Secondly, it reinforces the 
value for scientific psychology of mining (and conceptually polish-
ing) the rich material that is to be found in Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theory. Newbery exposes the crypto-Cartesianism and the scientific 
untenability of the dominant cognitive motivation theory in psy-
chology, at the same time showing that its objections to drive the-
ory are impotent and that the concept of drive contradicts only 
those aspects of contemporary models focusing on beliefs, needs, 
wishes and intentions which are in any case at odds with the princi-
ples of science. Finally, by elaborating on the distinctions between 
drive-satiation and drive-operation, and between primary drives 
and basic needs, the paper illustrates how realist work can clarify 
central psychological issues and extend them into new theoretical 
and empirical directions.  
References 
Anderson, J. (1929). The non-existence of consciousness: "Space, time and 
deity", by Samuel Alexander: review. Australasian Journal of Psy-
chology and Philosophy, 7(1), 68-73. 
Anderson, J. (1934). Mind as feeling. In Studies in Empirical Philosophy (pp. 68-
116 NIGEL MACKAY & AGNES PETOCZ
 
78). Sydney. 
Anderson, J. (1940). Freudianism and society. In Studies in empirical philoso-
phy (pp. 340-359). Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 
Anderson, J. (1953). The Freudian revolution. In Studies in empirical philoso-
phy (pp. 359-362). Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 
Anderson, J. R., & Bower, G. H. (1979). Human associative memory. Hillsdale, 
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Blackman, L. (2008). The body: The key concepts (English ed.). Oxford; New 
York: Berg. 
Deleuze, G. (1996). Deleuze: A critical reader. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA, 
USA: Blackwell. 
Derrida, J. (1990). Writing and difference. London: Routledge. 
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Gardner, S. (1993). Irrationality and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Gergen, K. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psy-
chology. American Psychologist, 40, 266-275. 
Gergen, K. (2001). Construction in contention: Toward consequential rela-
tions. Theory and Psychology, 11(3), 419-432. 
Gibson, J. J. (1950). The perception of the visual world. Boston, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative re-
search. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative 
research (pp. 105-117). London: Sage. 
Heil, J. (1989). Minds divided. Mind, 98, 571-583. 
Hibberd, F. J. (2001a). Gergen's social constructionism, logical positivism 
and the continuity of error. Part 1: Conventionalism. Theory & Psy-
chology, 11(3), 297-321. 
Hibberd, F. J. (2001b). Gergen's social constructionism, logical positivism 
and the continuity of error. Part 2: Meaning-as-use. Theory & Psy-
chology, 11(3), 323-346. 
Hume, D. (1739). A treatise of human nature: being an attempt to introduce the 
experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. London: Printed 
for John Noon. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988). The computer and the mind: An introduction to cog-
nitive science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago; London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Luce, R. D., & Tukey, J. W. (1967). Simultaneous conjoint measurement: A 
new type of fundamental measurement. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology, 1, 1-27. 
Mackay, N. (2003). Psychotherapy and the idea of meaning. Theory & Psy-
chology, 13(3), 359-386. 
ESSAYS IN REALISM: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 117
 
Massumi, B. (2002). Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation. Dur-
ham: Duke U.P. 
Maze, J. R. (1983). The meaning of behaviour. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Maze, J. R. (2001). Social constructionism, deconstructionism and some 
requirements of discourse. Theory & Psychology, 11(3), 393-417. 
McMullen, T. (1996). John Anderson on: Mind as feeling. Theory & Psychol-
ogy, 6(1), 153-168. 
McNamee, S. (2003). Bridging incommensurate discourses: A response to 
Mackay. Theory & Psychology, 13(3), 387-396. 
Michell, J. (1988). The problem of error for direct realism. Paper presented at 
the Twenty Fourth International Congress of Psychology, Sydney, 
Australia. 
Michell, J. (1990). An introduction to the logic of psychological measurement. 
Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Michell, J. (1994). Numbers as quantitative relations and the traditional 
theory of measurement. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
45(2): 389-406, 1994. 
Michell, J. (1997). Quantitative science and the definition of measurement 
in psychology. British Journal of Psychology, 88(3), 355-383. 
Michell, J. (1999). Measurement in psychology: A critical history of a methodo-
logical concept. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Michell, J. (2001). Teaching and misteaching measurement in psychology. 
Australian Psychologist, 36(3), 211-217. 
Michell, J. (2008). Is psychometrics pathological science? Measurement: In-
terdisciplinary Research and Perspectives, 6(1), 7-24. 
Michell, J. (2009a). The psychometricians’ fallacy: too clever by half? British 
Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 62, 41-55. 
Michell, J. (2009b). Invalidity in validity. In R. W. Lissitz (Ed.), The concept of 
validity. Revisions, new directions, and applications (pp. 111-133). 
Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing Inc. 
Michell, J. (2010). The quantity/quality interchange. A blind spot on the 
highway of science. In A. Toomela & J. Valsiner (Eds.), Methodologi-
cal thinking in psychology: 60 years gone astray? (pp. 45-68). Charlotte, 
NC: Information Age Publishing Inc. 
O'Neil, W. M. (1958). Basic issues in perceptual theory. Psychological Review, 
65, 348-359. 
Petocz, A. (1999). Freud, psychoanalysis, and symbolism. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Raskin, J. D., & Neimeyer, R. (2003). Coherent constructivism: A response to 
Mackay. Theory & Psychology, 13(3), 397-409. 
Rosch, E. (1988). Principles of categorization. In A. M. Collins & E. E. Smith 
(Eds.), Readings in cognitive science: A perspective from psychology and 
artificial intelligence (pp. 312-322). San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kauf-
mann. 
118 NIGEL MACKAY & AGNES PETOCZ
 
Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1998). Family resemblances: Studies in the inter-
nal structure of categories. In M. R. DePaul & W. M. Ramsey (Eds.), 
Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philoso-
phical inquiry (pp. 17-44). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Sherwood, M. (1969). The logic of explanation in psychoanalysis. New York: 
Academic. 
Stove, D. C. (1981). Popper and after: Four modern irrationalists. Oxford: Per-
gamon. 
Westen, D. (1997). Towards a clinically and empirically sound theory of 
motivation. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 78(3), 521-548. 
 
